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Abstract 
 
Modern portfolio theory (MPT), asset pricing models and broader financial modelling are 
dependent upon the accuracy of input parameters. For example, the accuracy of expected returns, 
standard deviations and correlations as an input into MPT will result in a more efficient selection 
of the optimal portfolio. These metrics are exposed to reference-day risk which is the variation in 
input estimation due to the selection of initial reference-day in calculations. This paper examines 
whether a change in reference-day, the day on which a metric is calculated, significantly affects 
estimates of risk-return metrics on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Thereafter, it applies 
these findings to the asset allocation problem of constructing a maximum Sharpe portfolio. The 
objective of this paper is to further prior research through the evaluation of an alternative 
simulation method and an extension of the range of tested metrics. The advancement of this prior 
research is achieved through the use of the Cholesky decomposition and a nonparametric 
bootstrapping procedure to generate reference-day risk-free estimates for average returns, standard 
deviations, correlations and betas. Furthermore, this paper applies the reference-day risk-free 
metrics to the construction of optimal multi-asset portfolios in the mean-variance framework. The 
findings suggest that through the use of a five-year period of monthly returns, the selection of a 
reference-day materially affects risk-return metrics and the subsequent portfolio characteristics 
that are based upon these metrics. The performance of portfolios, optimised on each reference-
day, ranged between 10% during the out-of-sample period. Additionally, using traditional end of 
month data resulted in underperformance of out-of-sample, overstated average returns, understated 
standard deviations and lower correlations between asset classes. Based on these findings we 
propose an alternative bootstrapping method for calculating reference-day risk-free metrics which 
reduces the effect of reference-day risk. The purpose of this methodology is to use these estimates 
for portfolio construction, risk management and asset pricing. The results of this paper indicate 
that reference-day risk makes a material difference in portfolio construction.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Throughout the history of financial markets, economic agents have sought to understand the nature 
and behaviour of asset returns. The adoption of quantitative methods from disciplines such as 
mathematics and statistics provides a formal framework from which to study asset returns and it 
forms the basis for many of the core theories of modern finance. Over the last century, these 
adoptions have revolutionised portfolio construction, risk management and asset pricing models. 
The statistical properties of asset returns are core components of these fields, providing a 
standardised framework for asset risk-return analysis and portfolio construction. The perceived 
benefits of this framework are dependent on an understanding of the underlying stochastic process 
of returns. Financial return distributions, their associated moments and the relationships between 
assets, provide a framework for this understanding and allows for the study of asset's behaviour 
under different environments over time.  In tandem to this is the exposure of these returns to 
specific factors, for example, systematic risk. This exposure, measured by beta, is a key input for 
many theories of empirical finance such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and multifactor 
models. Beta, in combination with the distribution moments and correlations, provides a toolbox 
of risk-return metrics for investment practitioners to allocate capital and manage risk under 
conditions of uncertainty efficiently. 
To make accurate inferences regarding asset prices and their interrelationships it is important the 
best estimate of inputs are used. Examples of these inferences are; to determine if equities are 
correlated with bonds; if a particular stock is considered aggressive or defensive; for testing market 
efficiency; to perform event studies, or to construct portfolios. Thus, the reliability of any analysis 
is dependent on the accuracy of the model inputs which are exposed to the core concept of this 
paper – reference-day risk. Reference-day risk, as defined by Acker and Duck (2007), is the 
variation in input estimation due to the selection of initial reference-day in calculations and forms 
the centre of this paper’s research problem. The concept of reference-day risk has been 
documented across global markets by Acker and Duck (2007); Feinstein, Polden, Richardson and 
Rajaratnam (2016); Dimitrov and Govindaraj (2007); Sahadev, Ward and Muller (2018); 
Gonzalez, Rodriguez and Stein (2014), as well as Baker, Rajaratnam and Flint (2016), with various 
methods being used to adjust for its influence on statistical variables. The predominant focus of 
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the literature has been on estimates of systematic risk or beta, with no standard method to both 
measure and adjust for reference-day risk across other metrics, such as average returns, standard 
deviations and correlations. Additionally, the research in the South African context has been 
particularly limited, with mixed results in proving the existence of and adjusting for reference-day 
risk across metrics.  Furthermore, to the authors own knowledge no research into the implications 
of reference-day risk on portfolio theory, which is sensitive to input estimation error is available 
(Michaud and Michaud, 2008).  Consequently, investment practitioners and academics who use 
statistical inputs to understand or test financial phenomena should account for the extent that the 
selection of initial reference-day influences their results. This is accounted for primarily because 
these inputs are based on partial datasets (last closing price of each month); while excluding the 
other trading day returns during the same period which could provide material information (Acker 
and Duck, 2007).  
As a result of these problems, the objectives of this paper are first, to establish the extent to which 
reference-day risk impacts commonly used risk-return metrics on the JSE. Secondly, to provide a 
nonparametric bootstrapping method to both; measure and adjust for reference-day risk in average 
returns, standard deviations, correlations and betas. Thirdly, to understand the nature and 
interrelationship of reference-day risk across these variables. Lastly, to apply these adjusted 
metrics to the construction of a reference-day risk-free efficient portfolio using the mean-variance 
framework as per Markowitz (1952). 
This paper is structured as follows; Chapter 2 provides relevant empirical literature on reference-
day risk and estimation errors in the international and South African context. Chapter 3 presents 
the theory and method for estimating reference-day risk-free, risk-return metrics through the use 
of simulated data and outlines the data and assumptions. Chapter 4 provides a discussion on the 
degree of reference-day risk on the JSE and estimates reference-day risk-free average returns, 
standard deviations, correlations and betas. Chapter 5 applies these findings through a case study, 
which focuses on the construction of a reference-day risk-free portfolio. These findings illustrate 
how reference-day risk translates from single stocks and metrics to asset classes and portfolios. 
The section concludes with a comparative analysis and a discussion regarding the performance of 
the reference-day risk-free portfolio. In Chapter 6, we conclude our findings, summarise the results 
and highlight the limitations present. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
This literature review begins with an introduction to estimation error followed by an overview of 
the empirical literature on reference-day risk from both an international and South African context. 
A discussion around the estimation of reference-day risk-free metrics on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) is then undertaken with a focus on the inputs to modern portfolio theory (average 
returns, standard deviations and correlations). This literature review concludes by discussing the 
simulation and nonparametric bootstrapping method that is employed in this paper. While the 
seminal work provides sufficient evidence of the existence of reference-day risk across metrics, 
such as average returns; median returns; standard deviations; betas and correlations, as well as 
useful methods of adjusting estimates for reference-day risk, there has been minimal focus on the 
application of these findings to modern portfolio theory. Specifically, in the South African context 
research has focused exclusively on systematic risk or beta (Baker et al., 2016; Sahadev et al., 
2018). 
The concept of mean-variance optimisation developed by Markowitz (1952), forms the foundation 
of modern portfolio theory (MPT) and serves as an instrument to systematically allocate resources 
to various investment alternatives. The optimisation process includes investors preferences, 
expectations of return, risk and correlations (either ex-post or ex-ante), under the assumption that 
through combining uncorrelated investments diversification can reduce the risk for a given amount 
of expected return. Furthermore, Markowitz (1952), outlined the assumption of a rational investor 
who aimed to maximise expected return per unit of risk, and through the mean-variance framework 
created the efficient frontier – the portfolio set that maximised return for a specified level of risk. 
On this efficient frontier sits the optimal portfolio commonly referred to as the tangency portfolio. 
This tangency portfolio represents the highest level of utility the investor could achieve with a set 
of constraints and a risk-free rate (Greig, 2016). Despite the empirical support and practical 
implications of MPT investment practitioners have shown reluctance regarding its use in practice 
which Michaud (1989) termed the “Markowitz optimisation enigma”. Fisher and Statman (1997), 
reiterated this finding, concluding that the optimal portfolio reflected the constraints imposed by 
the investor more so than the optimisation itself. When Markowitz (1952) introduced his seminal 
work, he made an assumption that investors knew exactly the input parameters and distributions 
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of assets to be included in the portfolio. However, in practice, portfolio optimisation techniques 
face risks of incorrect input estimation – one example being reference-day risk, which has until 
recently been considered by academics and investment practitioners as negligible (Acker and 
Duck, 2007).   
 
2.1. Estimation error 
In the literature, estimation risk refers to uncertainty due to sampling variation in the estimation of 
variables and is thought to apply to independent samples drawn from the same population (Acker 
and Duck, 2007: 1). Estimation risk has been researched extensively by Stein (1955), showing that 
traditional sample statistics are not suitable for multivariate analyses. Barry (1974) and Michaud 
and Michaud (2008) provided methods to identify and correct for estimation risk, whereas Chopra 
and Ziemba (1993) performed empirical tests to show that errors in return estimates are more 
important than errors in risk estimates. The Monte Carlo simulation was used by Bey, Burgess and 
Cook (1990) who took sample data, randomised it using bootstrap resampling and then 
recalculated the input parameters. They ran this simulation several times and found the optimal 
portfolio for each scenario, eliminated outliers and chose the most appropriate portfolio subject to 
prespecified investor constraints. Michaud (1998), performed a similar approach using a 
parametric resampling technique. Correspondingly, reference-day risk is by definition a form of 
estimation risk which this paper aims to measure and adjust for, in effect contributing to the 
broader estimation risk literature. 
 
2.2. Evidence of the existence of reference-day risk  
Evidence of reference-day risk has been found across geographies, variables, time and asset 
classes. Acker and Duck (2007), presented the notion of reference-day risk through the example 
of considering an estimate of a stocks’ sensitivity to the market (beta), its volatility (standard 
deviation), its return (average return) or its relationship with other assets (correlation). In practice, 
these variables are estimated using monthly historical price data, and the returns are calculated 
using the closing price from each month. However, given daily data, any initial reference-day 
could be chosen, for example, the 1st day of the month, the 3rd, the 4th, or the 10th, which cover the 
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same period (five-years); consequently, it can be assumed to be taken from the same population. 
Through this process, a number of monthly return series can be generated using different initial 
reference-days, which can result in a number of different estimates for the same period. Acker and 
Duck (2007), termed this type of variation, ‘reference-day’ variation and the related estimation 
risk as ‘reference-day risk’. This literature review continues by providing evidence of reference-
day risk in both the international and South African markets. 
 
2.2.1. Evidence from international markets 
Acker and Duck (2007), investigated the presence of reference-day risk in a sample of stocks 
drawn from the S&P 500 (459 companies) throughout fifteen-years which ended on 31 December 
2005. Parameters including betas, average returns, medians, standard deviations and correlations 
were estimated over three non-overlapping five-year periods, and the results were checked for data 
dependency using both CRSP and Datastream. The geographic dependency of the results was 
tested on the United Kingdom’s FTSE All Share Index. 
The estimates of means, medians and variances of the stock’s monthly returns for each of the 
twenty-eight reference-days were calculated and the highest, lowest and range difference across 
days were recorded for each stock’s corresponding metric. The results indicated that the selection 
of initial reference-day could have noticeable effects on the estimates of population variables. The 
selection of reference-day can double a stocks’ average monthly return or change the estimate from 
positive to negative (Acker and Duck, 2007: 7). The effect on median returns and variances was 
more extreme, with larger ranges and more frequent sign changes in medians than means. In some 
cases, the variances more than doubled for individual companies and the broader market (Acker 
and Duck, 2007: 8). Within these outcomes, the highest and lowest estimates were frequently 
separated by a large number of reference-days, and the results indicate certain reference-days 
might have a higher association to low or high estimates within the range. As an example, in the 
five-year period, ended December 2005, a stock’s average monthly return (unannualised) was -
0.239% moving up to +0.934% using a different reference-day, the median return (unannualised) 
on another stock over the period, ended December 1995, was estimated to be +6.07% using one 
reference-day but -1.49% using a reference-day a week later.  
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Furthermore, to test the effect of reference-day risk on correlations Acker and Duck (2007), used 
monthly returns between nine groups of fifty-one stocks, calculating correlations between each of 
the stocks in a selected group. These findings confirmed the aforementioned parameters with the 
choice of initial reference-day causing a change in the sign of correlations as well as changes of 
up 0.8. The average change in correlation between consecutive reference-days was 0.04 to 0.05 
with an absolute maximum change of 0.64 over the three periods analysed (Acker and Duck, 2007: 
9). 
Acker and Duck (2007), further investigated the sensitivity of both the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) and the Fama and French (1993) betas using the same sample of stocks, the S&P 500 
index as a market proxy and the United States 3-month Treasury Bill as the risk-free rate. The 
results indicated CAPM betas had a large degree of sensitivity to the reference-day in which they 
were calculated changing by as much as 4 (from -2 to +2) (Acker and Ducker, 2007: 11). For the 
four companies with the least sensitivity, altering the reference-day could determine if the stock 
was categorised as aggressive (above 1) or defensive (below 1) (Acker and Duck, 2007: 11). 
Overall 53% of the companies had betas varying from below 1 to above 1 as the reference-day was 
altered and 8% moved from negative to positive. Furthermore, when the difference between the 
smallest and largest beta was high, the smallest beta was frequently not significantly different from 
zero, while the largest was statistically significant. The results from the Fama and French (1993) 
betas indicate a similar degree of sensitivity to reference-day risk, with the size and valuation factor 
betas as sensitive as the market betas, displaying similar patterns (Acker and Duck, 2007: 12). 
These results demonstrate that reference-day risk, in individual inputs, can influence asset pricing 
models or portfolios that are constructed using these inputs. 
To demonstrate that this was not the result of idiosyncratic influences on single stocks and to 
provide long-term data that are not open to survivorship bias Acker and Duck (2007), investigated 
the correlation between international equity indices, which are important for international 
diversification. The correlation was analysed through the lens of three prisms, firstly their level, 
secondly their variability over time and thirdly their variability in extreme market conditions. To 
support their previous findings a different fifteen-year period was used (1975 – 1989) for the first 
two lenses and a thirty-year sample for the third. The results demonstrated that reference-day risk 
was as pertinent for the analysis of the behaviour of international equity markets as it was for the 
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analysis of the behaviour of individual company’s stock prices within a single market. The estimate 
of the correlation with the United States (US) market changed by as much as 0.46 when the initial 
reference-day changed.  For Italy and Japan, the highest correlation was twice that of the lowest, 
and in the last five-year period, more than five times higher.  Additionally, the change in 
correlations between consecutive periods was particularly dependent on the selection of initial 
reference-day. Where for the countries analysed the selection of reference-day determined if the 
correlation had strengthened or weakened over time. The range across countries was typically 
between 0.2 to 0.3 (Acker and Duck, 2007: 14). 
Moreover, to judge the presence of reference-day risk in the tails of the distributions is to answer 
the question as to whether correlations increase or decrease when markets experience volatile 
behaviour (Longin and Solnik, 2001). Similarly, there was considerable variation across reference-
days, where the variation tended to be more severe the fatter the tail and the fewer the observations 
present in these periods (Acker and Duck, 2007: 15). For example, in the correlations between the 
United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK), each reference-day displayed a pattern akin to the 
reference-days surrounding it. The correlation based on the 5th reference-day falls in bull markets 
and rises with increasing truncation in bear markets, while on the 12th they fall but only in bull 
markets. Additionally, on the 19th they fell in bear markets and rose in bull markets (Acker and 
Duck, 2007: 16). These results have implications for global investors who aim to build globally 
diversified portfolios as their estimates of correlations are influenced by the choice of reference-
day rather than the underlying co-movement. Thus, it is imperative that a consistent method is 
used to estimate such inputs which account for this risk.  
Dimitrov and Govindaraj (2007), investigated the data dependency of the Acker and Duck (2007) 
findings’ through 439 stocks from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and expanded 
the research through the use of daily rather than monthly returns over the period of January 1995 
to December 1999. They constructed several sixty-month return series covering nineteen 
reference-days, which used daily adjusted returns and confirmed the findings of Acker and Duck 
(2007), that the selection of reference-day significantly influences the estimates of beta. These 
results were confirmed for both individual companies as well as broad market indices in the United 
States market. 
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These findings were in turn extended by Gonzalez et al. (2014), by expanding on the amount of 
data and the methods used in the prior studies. Through a sample of 1563 companies that were 
traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges from 2007 to 2011, they confirmed that 
the selection of a reference-day resulted in differences in betas that were statistically significant. 
Moreover, Gonzalez et al. (2016), extended these findings by utilising a dataset of daily equity 
mutual fund returns to examine the influence that reference-day risk had on regression alphas, a 
statistic that is broadly employed to calculate fund performance. The outcomes acted in accordance 
with the behaviour noticed in other financial asset statistics: for a substantial portion of funds that 
exhibit significant alphas; significance is contingent on the reference-day utilised. This conclusion 
generates uncertainty regarding the inferences formerly attained employing this statistic. 
Additional tests demonstrate that the fluctuation of the alpha and its significance does not have a 
recognisable order and is not associated with fund attributes. Some methodologies have been 
conducted which could reduce the issue; these incorporate factor models and regression. However, 
utilising Student-t distributed errors did not produce positive results (Gonzalez et al., 2016). 
This evidence on reference-day risk across parameters, time and geographies illustrate that its’ 
effects cannot be seen as negligible as previous research suggested. Additionally, the selection of 
a reference-day can have varying results on the estimates of metrics generated from monthly return 
data. The inferences pulled from these types of estimates should be considered as sensitive when 
they are founded on monthly returns that are calculated from a single reference-day in a period. 
Following this, these findings will be extended to the South African context. 
 
2.2.2. Evidence from South Africa 
Baker et al. (2016), investigated the presence of reference-day risk on the South African Stock 
Exchange (JSE) over a five-year period, 2010 – 2015, and demonstrated its persistence after 
altering estimates of systematic risk (beta) for common adjustments. These findings confirm the 
geographic scope of reference-day risk found by Acker and Duck (2007), into emerging markets 
and specifically in the South African context. Their findings suggest the effect of changing 
reference-days on beta estimates were more pronounced for some companies (AngloGold Ashanti, 
Anglo American Platinum and Brait), yet remained relatively constant for others (Mondi, Remgro 
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and Standard Bank). They further tested for significant differences in betas across reference-days 
using the Pillai-Barlett trace from Fox, Friendly and Weisberg (2013) under two hypotheses: 
𝐻1:  That all the betas of a company are equal across reference-days 
𝐻2:  That the largest and smallest betas for the same company are significantly different 
Their results conclude that 𝐻1 could not be rejected for any companies; while 𝐻2 could be rejected 
at the 10% level for sixteen of the forty stocks and at the 5% level for six of the companies 
analysed. This indicates that when the reference-day is altered; there are companies with 
statistically different betas. Baker et al. (2016), using a bootstrapping method established that 
reference-day risk was prevalent on the JSE for betas of the top forty companies. This prevalence 
generates further uncertainty for investors who plan to use estimates for portfolio construction, 
risk management, or asset pricing. 
The findings of Baker et al. (2016) were extended by Feinstein et al. (2016) to include tests for the 
presence of reference-day risk in metrics other than beta for the components of the JSE Top 40. 
Their findings were that the three metrics; average returns, standard deviations and betas were 
influenced by the choice of initial reference-day. Betas and standard deviations had higher levels 
of sensitivity to reference-day risk than average returns based on the range of the highest and 
lowest estimates across days. They also showed the extent to which this sensitivity could translate 
into measures of performance such as Sharpe Ratios, with 18% of the forty company’s Sharpe 
Ratios going from negative to positive when the reference-day was varied. 
An additional study by Sahadev et al. (2018), investigated the extent that reference-day risk led to 
differences in betas on the JSE All Share Index. They confirmed that across twenty reference-days 
the unadjusted betas varied significantly. Their findings were that fifteen out of the one hundred 
and thirty-six companies exhibited betas, that could be categorised as positive or negative 
depending on the selection of day. In order to identify the level which altering the reference-day 
leads to a variation in betas, Sahadev et al. (2018), performed an ANOVA and found that at the 
5% level of significance there was inadequate proof to validate a trading day impact on beta when 
the reference-day was changed (p-value of 0.501). The insufficient evidence could be caused by 
the covariance between returns cancelling each other out and is surprising given the ranges of beta 
estimates across reference-days.  
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Similarly, these results are consistent with Baker et al. (2016), who were not able to statistically 
validate an impact on beta across their twenty estimates.  Although, when the difference between 
the minimum and maximum estimate was used it yielded different results, where a t-test comparing 
the betas between firms demonstrated that the min-max range significantly varied at the 5% level 
(p-value < 0.0001). Subsequently, evidence is provided regarding the effect of common 
adjustments made to account for reference-day risk.  
 
2.3. Adjusting for reference-day risk 
The presence of traditional sampling variation and the estimation risk that it results in is identified 
in academic literature, and several efforts have been made to deal with it, mainly in terms of beta 
estimation and reference-day risk. These beta methods include that of Blume (1971), Vasicek 
(1973) and Dimson (1979) in the international context and Baker et al. (2016) and Sahadev et al. 
(2018) in the South African context. Outlined below are the key findings that these methods have 
when they adjust for reference-day risk. 
Acker and Duck (2007), found that the adjustments recommended by Blume (1971) and Vasicek 
(1973), reduced the variation of beta estimates for companies across reference-days. The adjusted 
betas were sensitive to the selection of a reference-day and reduced the average range between the 
highest and lowest beta for all companies. However, the selection of a reference-day could cause 
the betas to be double those attained from other reference-days and could result in them being re-
categorised as aggressive or defensive depending on the choice of the day. The reference-day 
variation using the Dimson (1979) method made no improvement over the unadjusted alternative, 
and in some cases was worse. These results show that adjusting beta estimates for thin trading 
using the Dimson (1979) method does not make a difference to reference-day variation. While 
these adjustments have limited usefulness for beta estimation, they are less useful regarding the 
estimation of reference-day risk-free correlations, means and standard deviations – which are 
inputs in modern portfolio theory. 
In addition, an alternative method was employed by Fama and French (1993), by structuring 
portfolios of stocks and building estimates on portfolios rather than single stocks. This technique 
is often utilised in tests of asset-pricing models as well as in the examinations of stock market 
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anomalies. Acker and Duck (2007), found this method to considerably reduce the range between 
minimum and maximum values across reference-days but did not eliminate the impact of the 
reference-day choice on estimation. Although the results indicated using portfolio-level returns 
was the most successful method, this was primarily due to the averaging property embodied in 
forming portfolios, which emphasises that diversification reduces portfolio risk and reference-day 
risk. Despite this averaging property, there remained an amount of variability in estimation, and 
thus reference-day risk has important implications regarding the implementation of modern 
portfolio theory based on these inputs. 
Furthermore, as a result of most institutional investors making adjustments to beta, Baker et al. 
(2016), investigated whether reference-day risk persisted even after making the adjustments by 
Blume (1971), Dimson (1979) and Vasicek (1973), on JSE listed companies. They found that the 
Blume (1971) betas increased the difference between the highest and lowest betas for nineteen of 
the thirty-one companies with a single stock’s beta increasing by 81%, which is consistent with 
Acker and Duck (2007) – that the adjustment failed to improve estimation when reference-day risk 
was present. These findings implied that the Blume (1971) adjustment failed to reduce the high-
low range among betas when reference-day risk was present. When the Dimson (1979) thin trading 
adjustment method is used, the average beta range was 0.608, which was more extensive than the 
average range of OLS betas, of 0.449. Where the beta ranges expanded for thirty of the forty 
companies. This expansion demonstrates that when the Dimson (1979) method is used, it increases 
reference-day risk. Under the Vasicek (1973) adjustments, Baker et al. (2016) found that it reduced 
the occurrences of extreme differences with thirty-five of the forty companies displaying lower 
average ranges than their unadjusted betas. These findings suggest that after making the 
adjustments from Blume (1971), Dimson (1979) and Vasicek (1973), reference-day risk in betas 
continued to persists when calculation was based on only a single reference-day.  
Moreover, Gonzalez et al. (2014), compared a technique based on the t-distribution for adjusting 
betas; established by Cademartori, Romo, Campos and Galea (2003), to the standard OLS 
regression. They proposed the student t-distribution was more appropriate for beta estimation in 
the presence of reference-day risk as it compensated for the residual in the regression method. 
Additionally, they proved that the t-distribution technique was better able to integrate the effect of 
outliers when calculating beta. Gonzalez et al. (2014), also re-tested the Blume (1971) adjustment 
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and concluded as per the research by Acker and Duck (2007), that it was the technique that 
accounted for the impact of reference-day risk the best. However, they also confirmed that betas 
exhibited significant variation across reference-days even after adjustment.  
Therefore, after making adjustments in estimating statistical variables from returns data, the effects 
of reference-day risk persist, in both the international and the South African context. Following 
this, the literature review introduces and discusses the proposed methods for estimating reference-
day risk-free metrics for average returns, standard deviations, correlations and betas. 
 
2.4. Estimating reference-day risk-free metrics 
There are two primary methods proposed in the literature not only to adjust a given metric for 
reference-day risk; but to estimate a reference-day risk-free version for a given metric. The first 
was a nonparametric bootstrapping technique proposed by Baker et al. (2016), and the second was 
a volume-weighted-average-price (VWAP) proposed by Sahadev et al. (2018). Both of these 
techniques applied to estimate a reference-day risk-free version of beta. 
Baker et al. (2016), proposed a bootstrapping method to estimate a beta independent of reference-
day risk. By calculating a beta estimate for each reference-day for instance; day one, day two until 
day twenty, the average of these days could serve as an approximation of the reference-day risk-
free estimate. However, this estimate would create errors as a result of the small sample size (Ader 
and Ader, 2008: 373). Baker et al. (2016), proposed a bootstrapped distribution method for 
estimating a reference-day risk-free estimate. The basis of this method was that the underlying 
distribution of any metric is unobservable, and the expected value of this distribution served as the 
most accurate metric value. Hence their method focused on the estimation of this point estimate 
rather than the distribution itself. 
To test the robustness of their method, they simulated returns for a hypothetical stock and the 
market index with a predefined beta relationship and ran their bootstrapping method to test if they 
were able to estimate the true value of beta for the dataset. Both of the series were based on 
Brownian motion to control for the level of correlation between the two series. The data is sorted 
into a table of sixty by twenty (sixty months, twenty days) and a random day is chosen from each 
month, for example, day one in month one, day five in month two until day n of month sixty, along 
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with the corresponding day in the market sequence. An estimate of beta is then calculated, and the 
process is repeated with replacement 100 000 times to generate a distribution of betas, which is 
graphed. This process was tested assuming both normal and uniform distributions. If normality 
was assumed, then the simulated bootstrapped average was predominately within half of a standard 
deviation from the predefined value. When the distribution was presumed to be uniform, the 
bootstrapped distribution remained relatively normal and became more condensed around the 
mean. The results remained consistent regardless of the assumed beta estimate before the 
simulation was run. Baker et al. (2016), noted that the point estimate of beta from the distribution 
was generally equal to the average of the twenty betas calculated across the twenty reference-days, 
despite the risk of introducing errors because of a small sample size. This provides a quick method 
for practical applications or for those without access to relevant software for estimating a 
reference-day risk-free estimate using more advanced methods. 
Furthermore, this method was tested by Feinstein et al. (2016) who found betas to behave in a 
manner consistent with Baker et al. (2016) across days. However, average returns and standard 
deviations bootstrapped estimates were found to be slightly lower than the average across the 
twenty reference-days. This phenomenon translated into Sharpe Ratios based on these 
bootstrapped values which were also understated relative to their twenty-day average. 
Alternatively, Sahadev et al. (2018), investigated a volume-weighted-average-price (VWAP) beta. 
They used the constituents of the JSE All Share Index (136 shares) from DataStream for the period 
from 31 December 1992 to 30 June 2017. This investigation involved testing the statistical 
relevance of utilising the VWAP estimate relative to the standard beta method. Sahadev et al. 
(2018), used a sixty-day (reference-day inclusive) ex-ante VWAP, which was estimated using 
method from Ting (2006), to calculate beta estimates rather than closing prices alone. In order to 
comprehend whether the VWAP beta was an improved estimate of systematic risk relative to the 
unadjusted beta in the presence of reference-day risk, they were both estimated utilising the same 
sample period and tested for statistical differences using a paired t-test. The two results were 
confirmed as statistically different. 
Firstly, Sahadev et al. (2018), aimed to estimate the distributions of VWAP betas for the 136-
company sample, and if these distributions exhibited less dispersion around the mean relative to 
estimates of traditional betas. Secondly, they sought to identify if a specific beta in the twenty-day 
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range tended to be a more precise estimate of systematic risk. Both graphical and statistical analysis 
was undertaken akin to Baker et al. (2016), with a focus on the skew and dispersion of the VWAP 
adjusted and unadjusted betas distributions. The normality of these distributions was tested using 
statistical tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramer-Von Mises and Anderson-Darling) and the 
variances of each distribution were analysed as per Gonzalez et al. (2014), to test the fit around 
the mean. Lastly, to validate these findings a Levene’s test was conducted, confirming the 
graphical outcome. The results of the Levene’s test indicated that the 20th reference-day exhibited 
the most suitable betas.  In comparison, The VWAP calculation resulted in a less statistically 
suitable set of betas. In some of the more extreme cases, the VWAP method resulted in slightly 
more robust estimates, but this could not be directly attributed to the method as much as the 
inherent volatility in the share prices. 
Consequently, this paper aims to build on the bootstrapping method proposed by Baker et al. 
(2016), due to its statistical reliability and consistency in results. This literature review continues 
by addressing the choice for a risk-free rate to be used in performance evaluation and for portfolio 
optimisation.   
 
2.5. Choice of risk-free rate 
The risk-free rate is a significant input into the empirical testing of financial theory and forms the 
foundation for key aspects of finance, for instance portfolio theory, asset pricing models and 
corporate financial modelling as per Damodaran (2008), Vaihekoski (2014) and Ernst and Young 
(2009). Risk-free rates predominantly matter due to their use in computing discount rates to 
discount future cash flows. The cost of equity adds a risk-adjusted equity risk premium to the risk-
free rate, the cost of debt adds a default spread, and thus ceteris paribus higher risk-free rates result 
in higher discount rates, higher risk premiums and lower present values when using discounted 
cash flow valuation (Damodaran, 2008: 4). This section first defines a risk-free rate; then it 
addresses common issues in determining an appropriate rate and concludes with a review of 
relevant literature on a risk-free rate in the South African context. 
A risk-free asset is one in which the realised return is always equal to the expected return and 
meets the conditions outlined in Damodaran (2008), of having cash flows specified at initiation, 
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no reinvestment risk and no default risk in the entity from which the cashflows originate. Further, 
Damodaran (2008), provides a framework for deciding an appropriate risk-free rate which 
addresses the idea of real versus nominal rates, finding a risk-free proxy and the nonstationary of 
the risk-free rate. 
Inflation volatility or consistently high inflation can cause nominal variables to become too 
unstable to use in valuation and modelling. To account for this instability Damodaran (2008) 
suggests using real variables for inputs such as betas and expected returns. South Africa’s headline 
inflation rate as calculated by the Consumer Price Index has ranged from three to seven percent 
over the last eight years, which this paper considers as stable enough to use as inputs into our 
calculations.  
The South African government issues both foreign and domestic currency denominated debt and 
thus avoids the issue of having no long-term risk-free proxy issued by the government in local 
currency. South African government bonds, as of July 2018, are rated at Baa3 by Moody’s and BB 
by S&P, which implies that the returns are not entirely risk-free. This paper accepts rating agencies 
assessment of country risk. Furthermore, South Africa has historically defaulted numerous times 
on sovereign debt, and it would thus be incorrect to use unadjusted government bond yields as 
representative of risk-free rates. This is because there is an element of default risk embedded in 
the rate, causing the default risk in risk premiums to be double counted, resulting in higher discount 
rates and lower than actual estimates of value (Damodaran, 2008: 24).  To account for this effect 
Damodaran (2008) suggests two methods of adjusting for risk: using the Credit Default Swap 
(CDS) spread method or using credit ratings to imply a default spread. In both cases, the spread is 
subtracted from the ten-year government bond yield to arrive at a better reflection of a risk-free 
rate. This paper adopts the CDS spread method to adjust for default risk. 
In practice, most firms in South Africa use long-term government bonds that have a smoother 
volatility profile and result in a better fit with the terms of investments of companies (Correia and 
Cramer, 2008: 12). The survey data provided below aims to capture the most common proxy for a 
risk-free rate, for the purposes of valuation and financial modelling in the context of South Africa 
given the conditions outlined by Damodaran (2008). Correia and Cramer (2008), indicated that 
most firms used a long-term government bond yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate. They found 
a large disparity in the maturity of the instrument used but found greater use of the R153 bond. 
 24 
Correia and Cramer (2008), also found that 80% of firms do not adjust for tax when determining 
the risk-free rate for CAPM. This finding corresponds with the standard form of CAPM from the 
academic literature. The latest valuation method survey by PwC (2017), shows that these trends 
have persisted over time with the preference shifting to the 10-year government bond yield. This 
yield was used by 33% of respondents followed by the R208 by 13% and the R213 by 10%, which 
is consistent with both the 2016 and 2015 survey results as well as surveys from before 2010. Thus, 
over the last two decades in South Africa, the risk-free rate has consistently been calculated using 
longer-dated government bonds – with the 10-year being one of the most liquid and referenced. 
This paper uses the South African government 10-year bond yield net of the appropriate CDS 
spread as per the Damodaran (2008) method, as a representation of the risk-free rate for the 
application to portfolio construction.  
 
2.6. Conclusions drawn from the literature 
The preceding literature substantiated the existence of reference-day risk across time, geographies 
and metrics with reference-day risk remaining prevalent even after making common adjustments. 
While the literature has focused predominantly on beta, no research has been done into the 
application of these findings to other metrics such as average returns, standard deviations or 
correlations in South Africa. A further gap in the literature is with regards to the implementation 
of a consistent method to both measure reference-day risk and to calculate a reference-day risk-
free estimate. Furthermore, no research has been done into the implications of these results for 
modern portfolio theory, which uses these metrics as inputs. The remainder of this paper aims to 
extend the above literature in these areas by providing a robust method to both measure and 
account for reference-day risk in estimation and apply the findings to the construction of an optimal 
reference-day risk-free portfolio. 
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Chapter 3: Data and Assumptions 
 
This research utilises the end of day closing prices of the largest fifty-six qualifying companies by 
market capitalisation on the JSE and the closing level of the JSE All Share Index (JSE), the South 
African Composite Bond Index (ALBI), the MSCI World Index (MSCI), the FTSE/JSE Property 
index (SAPY) and the Bloomberg All Commodity Index between 1st January 2013 to 31st 
December 2018. A qualifying company is one which has six-years of historical returns data during 
these defined dates and is in the top eighty companies ranked by market capitalisation on the JSE. 
This price data was sourced from Bloomberg. The choice of fifty-six companies aims to extend 
previous reference-day risk research on the JSE which has focused on the largest forty companies 
(Baker et al., 2016); while maintaining a liquid enough sample to minimise the impact of illiquidity 
as noted by Bradfield (2003). A full list of the fifty-six qualifying companies used in this paper is 
provided in Appendix A. 
In accordance with Baker et al. (2016), Sahadev et al. (2018), Gonzalez et al. (2014), prices were 
adjusted for corporate actions such as unbundling’s, share splits or mergers as well as for dividend 
pay-outs. All the prices were denominated in South African Rand converted at the appropriate 
daily closing exchange rate. This paper does not account for survivorship bias in its method; 
however, it acknowledges that this bias could be introduced through the inclusion of the chosen 
companies as listed in the All Share Index throughout this time. According to Baker et al. (2016) 
and Dimson (1979), this paper performs no thin trading adjustment on beta because the sample 
includes only large capitalisation liquid companies. As a consequence of the variability in the price 
data available, we standardised our calculations to twenty trading days in a given month. 
Companies that did not have the full six-years of required returns data were removed from our 
analysis. For instances where there were greater than twenty trading days in a given month, we 
used the first twenty days and removed all trading days thereafter. Whereas, for the companies 
which had fewer than twenty trading days; the last day’s price was kept constant in accordance 
with Acker and Duck (2007). The risk-free rate used in this paper is the average ten-year yield on 
the South African government bond during the sample period of 8.37%. This rate is adjusted using 
the average ten-year credit default swap spread of 2.84% as described in section 2.5, resulting in a 
risk-free rate of 5.53%. In Chapters 4 and 5, we assume that when one calculates average returns, 
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standard deviations, correlations and betas that we are drawing a random variable from a 
distribution that estimates the real underlying variable. For example, the true underlying systematic 
risk measured by beta and the total risk by standard deviation. 
This paper adopts the assumption that stock and index returns are lognormally distributed when 
performing simulation, inferential analysis and bootstrapping (Dimson, 1979; Baker et al., 2016). 
This paper's research is centred around the presumption that companies price returns have 
verifying degrees of dependence on the market (index) based on the market model: 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑀𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 ,  
where 𝑅𝑡  is stock return at time t, 𝛼 is the component of return not explained by the market, 𝑀𝑡 is 
the market return at time t, 𝜀𝑡 is the error of the return estimate, and 𝛽 is the exposure to market 
movements explained by: 
𝛽𝑖 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖; 𝑅𝑚)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚)
 , 
where  𝛽𝑖 is the beta for company i, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖; 𝑅𝑚) is the covariance between the returns of company 
i and the returns of the market, and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚) is the variance of the market returns. This metric, 
which this paper refers to as beta, reflects an approximation of the systematic risk embodied in a 
stock's return. Furthermore, this paper assumes that volatility is represented by standard deviation, 
that ex-post average returns represent the best estimate of ex-ante returns and that all stocks have 
a relationship with all other assets based on the co-movement of returns. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that these variables are nonstationary, and thus in the process of measurement are exposed to 
reference-day risk. 
In addition, excess kurtosis is defined as any value in excess of 3, and a correlation greater than 
0.5 or less than -0.5 is assumed to represent a strong positive or negative linear relationship 
between variables respectively. Unless otherwise stated, this paper makes use of annualised returns 
and standard deviations. When testing for reference-day risk in correlations and betas, it is assumed 
that the reference index is the ALSI, unless otherwise stated. This assumption allows for 
comparative analysis against the same underlying benchmark for each of the companies.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology, Results and Discussion 
 
For the purpose of performing multi-metric analyses, this paper organises five-years of returns into 
a sixty by twenty table, with the sixty rows representing the sixty months in a five-year period and 
the twenty columns representing the twenty trading days in each of the sixty months. The first 
column represents the first day of the month, the second column the second day, and the first two 
rows represent the first and second month respectively, counting up to the sixtieth month. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, each month has approximately twenty trading days, where weekends and 
local public holidays; when the market is closed, are excluded. Each metric is calculated based on 
the respective reference-day, for example, the first average return is calculated using the returns 
from the first day from each of the sixty months, the second average return using the second day 
until all twenty averages are calculated. Correlations and betas are calculated using the same 
method, where for instance the correlation using the first reference-day is based on the first day of 
each of the sixty months for both the stock and market returns. Inspecting the average returns, 
standard deviations, correlations and betas calculated across reference-days, all of these metrics 
are affected by varying degrees of reference-day risk. Below, we give an overview of the variation 
in these metrics across reference-days and provide the results of statistical tests to illustrate the 
significance of this variation. 
 
4.1. Evaluating the existence of reference-day risk in South Africa 
This section provides evidence of the existence of reference-day risk in average returns, standard 
deviations, correlations and betas. Furthermore, the interrelationship of reference-day risk across 
metrics and the practical implications of reference-day risk for each metric is discussed. 
 
4.1.1. Evidence found in average returns and standard deviations 
Average returns over the five-year period for the fifty-six companies had an average range from 
the lowest to the highest day of 3.9%, a median range of 3.5% and standard deviation of 2% across 
reference-days. Kumba Iron Ore, Anglo American platinum and Capitec had the highest ranges of 
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12.5%, 7.4% and 7% respectively. Companies who had the lowest sensitivity to reference-day risk 
in their average returns were Richemont, Fortress A and MTN who had ranges of 1.5%, 1.6% and 
1.7% respectively. Overall there was wide dispersion across both companies and sectors depending 
on the choice of initial reference-day, with the high-low ranges exhibiting a positive skew of 1.81 
and excess kurtosis of 3.2 in the distribution of the fifty-six ranges for average returns. 
To investigate if there were significant differences in average returns across the twenty reference-
days, we performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the hypotheses: 
𝐻0: 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 = ⋯ = 𝜇20  
𝐻1: Two or more average returns are significantly different accross days  
While the underlying sample distributions for each average return may not conform to the ANOVA 
normality assumption, according to Kuzma and Bohnenblust (2005) as long as the sample sizes 
are large and equal or nearly equal, moderate departures from normality are not a problem. The 
samples in this paper conform to this requirement, as they are of equal size for this test. In addition, 
because the ANOVA test is robust, it is acceptable if the largest standard deviation is less than 
double the smallest standard deviation in the sample, which was the case for the fifty-six 
companies analysed in this paper (Sullivan, 2011). 
Despite the varying high-low ranges of average returns, the ANOVA results indicated that none 
of the fifty-six companies had average returns that were significantly different across reference-
days, even at the 10% significance level. To reaffirm these results, we investigated if the highest 
average return was significantly different from the lowest average return across reference-days 
using a two-sample t-test with the hypotheses: 
𝐻0:  𝜇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑤 
𝐻1:  𝜇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ≠ 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑤 
As with the ANOVA results, no companies exhibited significant differences in their highest and 
lowest average returns across the twenty reference-days, with an average p-value of 0.4606 across 
the fifty-six companies. The companies with the lowest p-values were Rand Merchant Insurance, 
INTU properties and Barclays; while the highest were Exxaro, Richemont and MTN. The 
companies with the lowest p-values, which had the most significant difference between the highest 
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and lowest average returns, were not the companies with the highest absolute high-low range 
differences. In contrast; however, both MTN and Richemont had two of the lowest absolute ranges 
but the highest p-values. While the p-values are high relative to significance levels of 5% and 10%, 
their variation across stocks and sectors; along with the fact that on average they were less than 
0.5, imply that the impact of reference-day risk should be considered in empirical tests. This impact 
should be accounted for during any application that uses average returns as an input.  
The initial choice of reference-day in calculating average returns has implications for both 
portfolio construction and asset pricing. Modern portfolio theory is based on using average returns 
as an input in estimating efficient portfolios (Elton and Gruber, 1997: 1745). Therefore, if the 
estimate of return varies considerably across reference-days, the conclusions drawn from using 
one day in the reference period creates a bias in the end portfolio. This bias results in conclusions 
that are either not consistent ex-post or are a function of the choice of reference-day and not the 
true return profile of the underlying asset over the reference period. For example, if the 20th 
reference-day was used for INTU properties, there was an average return of 0.37%, but if the 1st 
day was used, there was an average return of -4.98%. The same applies to AngloGold Ashanti 
whose average return on the 15th reference-day was -2.4%; while it was 2.81% on the 4th day. This 
phenomenon occurred for three of the fifty-six companies (5%).  From a different perspective, 
reference-day risk applies not only for changes from negative to positive returns but for large 
deviations in positive returns. For example, Kumba Iron Ore and Rand Merchant Investments had 
ranges of 12.5% and 6.3% across the twenty reference-days respectively. These results have an 
impact on the return assumptions an investor makes about a particular company, and on the weight 
applied to a stock in a portfolio optimised using the mean-variance framework. 
The practical implications for asset pricing can be illustrated through the equity risk premium, 
which is a core component of discount rates used in equity valuation models (Damodaran, 2015). 
The historical equity risk premium is equal to the excess return of a stock above a risk-free asset 
over a given period that is represented by the difference between the average return and the risk-
free rate. The choice of reference-day influences the average return, and thus the spread above or 
below the risk-free rate the stock exhibits. Should the choice of reference-day yield high excess 
returns, then the equity risk premium will be higher, the discount rate higher, and future cash flows 
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that are discounted back would result in a lower present valuation ceteris paribus. The inverse 
applies if the choice of reference-day understates the true average return for a period.   
There are also implications for performance management where for example, if a performance 
analyst is looking for stocks which had an average return that was higher than the JSE All Share 
Index over the last five years. For illustrative purposes, the 20th reference-day is used as the average 
return of the index of 9.32%. For seven of the fifty-six companies (12.5%) the choice of reference-
day impacted the conclusion that a stock on average under or outperformed the benchmark. For 
example, when Shoprite was analysed using the 16th reference-day, there was underperformance 
of -3.53%; while when using the 1st reference-day there was outperformance of 1.48%.  
Therefore, it is important for purposes of portfolio construction, asset pricing and performance 
measurement that a reliable estimate of the average return for a stock over a specified period be 
estimated. A full breakdown of the above analysis of average returns can be found in Appendix B. 
Following the analysis of average returns, this paper continues by focusing on standard deviations. 
Standard deviations over the five-year period for the fifty-six companies had an average range 
from the lowest to the highest day of 6.14%, a median range of 5.3% and a standard deviation of 
3%. Anglo American PLC, Glencore and AngloGold Ashanti had the highest ranges of 12.22%, 
11.59% and 10.26% respectively. Companies who had the lowest sensitivity to reference-day risk 
in their standard deviations were AVI, Spar and Richemont who had ranges of 2.86%, 3.33% and 
3.42% respectively. Relative to average returns there was wider dispersion in standard deviations 
across companies over this period, with excess kurtosis of 10.6 and skewness of 3.06 for the 
distribution of standard deviation ranges of the fifty-six companies.  
To investigate whether the standard deviations were significantly different across reference-days, 
we tested to see if the highest standard deviation was significantly different to the lowest, using an 
F-test with the hypotheses: 
𝐻0:  𝜎ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = 𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑤 
𝐻1:  𝜎ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ≠ 𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑤 
A requirement for the use of the F-test is that there is an assumption of normality for the sample 
being analysed. Considering that we are comparing two standard deviations from two reference-
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days, we have two samples of sixty-days for each company. To test the normality of the sample, a 
Shapiro-Wilk test was used with the hypotheses: 
𝐻0:  the data is normally distributed 
𝐻1:  the data is not normally distributed  
When the fifty-six companies were analysed on the reference-day which had the highest standard 
deviation, thirty-eight of the companies (68%) were normally distributed at the 5% level. By 
comparison, forty-eight of the fifty-six companies (86%) were normal at the 5% level on the 
reference-day with the lowest standard deviation. These results show that the normality assumption 
of returns is not consistent across reference-days, with nine of the fifty-six companies (16%) 
exhibiting normality in one reference-day and not the other.  The F-test results point to an average 
p-value of 0.12 across the fifty-six companies, with fifteen companies (27%) having standard 
deviations significantly different at the 5% level, thirty-three (60%) at the 10% level and forty-six 
(82%) companies at the 20% level. These results indicate a strong presence of reference-day risk 
in standard deviation across reference-days and were significantly higher than average returns.   
Given these results and since not all the samples were normal, we did not rely solely on the F-test 
result. In addition, this paper tested for homogeneity of standard deviations across the twenty 
reference-days using a Levene’s (1960) and Brown-Forsythe (1973) test with the hypotheses: 
𝐻0:  𝜎1 = 𝜎2 = ⋯ = 𝜎20 
𝐻1:  At least one standard deviation is significantly different.  
Despite the wide high-low ranges in standard deviations across reference-days and the findings of 
the F-test above, both the Levene and Brown-Forsythe test failed to reject the null hypothesis that 
standard deviations were equal across reference-days at both the 5% and 10% level. These findings 
are analogous to those of Baker et al. (2016) and Sahadev et al. (2018), who used a similar test to 
analyse the dispersion of betas across trading days. They could not statistically verify a reference-
day impact across their twenty betas for the largest forty companies on the JSE; however, they 
found significant differences when comparing the highest and lowest betas. These results 
correspond with the above results.  
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These findings have practical implications for performance measurement metrics that use standard 
deviation as an input, such as the Sharpe ratio, overall risk management processes and portfolio 
management processes that target specific volatility levels. The value of the Sharpe ratio moves 
inversely with standard deviation ceteris paribus. This means that when a portfolio’s performance 
is measured based on a reference-day; where the portfolio’s standard deviation was high, the 
Sharpe ratio would be understated relative to the ratio that would be independent of reference-day 
risk. In contrast, if the reference-day that was chosen resulted in a lower estimate of the standard 
deviation relative to other reference-days the inverse would apply. The same logic can pertain to 
portfolios constructed on the basis of targeting a specific volatility level, for example, that of the 
ALSI. The ALSI volatility ranged from 8.89% to 10.2% across reference-days. Four (7%) 
companies had their lowest standard deviations below 8.89% but their highest standard deviation 
above 10.2% across the twenty reference-days. Therefore, targeting a specific volatility level using 
one reference-day leads to portfolio volatility that deviates significantly from expectations. Thus, 
it is important for risk management, performance measurement and portfolio construction 
techniques, that rely on standard deviations as an input, to be based on an estimate that reflects the 
true volatility profile across reference-days. A breakdown of standard deviation ranges can be 
found in Appendix C.  
 
4.1.2. Evidence found in betas and correlations 
In line with the findings of Gonzalez et al. (2014), Baker et al. (2016) and Sahadev et al. (2018), 
betas changed depending on the choice of initial reference-day for the fifty-six companies. Betas 
over the five-year period had an average range from their highest to lowest day of 0.58, a median 
range of 0.49 and a standard deviation of 0.34. Glencore, Kuma Iron Ore and AngloGold Ashanti 
had the highest ranges of 1.82, 1.68 and 1.44 respectively. Companies with the lowest exposure to 
reference-day risk in their betas were Redefine, Sanlam and Investec with ranges of 0.18, 0.19 and 
0.25 respectively. While there was a dispersion in beta ranges across days, the excess kurtosis of 
the distribution of ranges was lower than the average returns and the standard deviations at 1.4. 
The skewness corresponded with the average returns of 1.96. Out of the fifty-six companies, 
twenty-five (45%) had betas that ranged from below 1 (defensive) to above 1 (aggressive), and 
three (5%) had betas moving from negative to positive when the reference-day was changed. Out 
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of the ten companies with the largest high-low beta ranges, there were no companies from the 
financial sector, with the ten being a mix of resource, property and retail companies. This outcome 
is counter to the findings of Sahadev et al. (2018), who found nine out of the top ten companies 
were resources companies and could be attributed to the wider sample size used in their study. 
Since the statistical significance of reference-day risk in OLS betas on the JSE has been 
investigated extensively by Baker et al. (2016) and Sahadev et al. (2018), this paper aimed to 
confirm these findings for a more recent period under the hypotheses and test statistic of: 
𝐻0:  𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤 
𝐻1:  The highest beta across reference-days is significantly different from the lowest beta 
𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤
√𝑆𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
2 + 𝑆𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤
2
  , 
where 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ is the highest beta across reference-days, 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤 is the lowest beta across reference-
days, 𝑆𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ is the standard error of the highest beta, and  𝑆𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑤 is the standard error of the lowest 
beta.  
Our findings confirmed the presence of reference-day risk in OLS betas using the ALSI as the 
reference index, with fourteen (25%) of the fifty-six-companies exhibiting betas that were not 
statistically different across reference-days. Six (11%) of the betas were significantly different at 
the 5% level, fourteen betas (25%) at the 10% level and twenty-two (39%) at the 20% level. These 
results confirmed the extent of the differences in betas across companies, sectors and reference-
days. The differences between betas have implications for the application of beta-style portfolio 
construction, estimating appropriate exposure to risk premiums and the CAPM (which applies beta 
to the equity risk premium). 
To illustrate this, consider an investor who responds adversely to risk, seeking to construct a 
defensive portfolio that exhibits less sensitivity to market movements with a beta below 1. Assume 
that the investor estimated the beta of a stock using a reference-day that exhibited a lower beta, for 
example, AngloGold Ashanti had a beta of 0.76 on the 18th reference-day, MMI had a beta of 0.82 
on the 1st reference-day, and Standard Bank had a beta of 0.83 on the 17th reference-day. The 
investor could be both underestimating beta and constructing a portfolio that is in effect the 
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opposite of that intended at the offset. For instance, using the same three companies, and using the 
12th, 14th and 2nd reference-days, yielded betas that moved from below to above 1 of 2.19, 1.34 and 
1.12 respectively. This type of portfolio exhibits stronger fluctuations in its value when the market 
moves relative to choosing a reference-day exhibiting lower systematic risk leading to the portfolio 
deviating from the risk-return objectives and constraints outlined at initiation when the portfolio 
was constructed.  
The same example could be extended to an investor wanting to construct a portfolio that moves 
inversely to the market achieved, by having a beta less than 0. When Intu properties was analysed 
on eight out of the twenty reference-days, it yielded negative betas with a range of -0.22 to 0.27. 
This example demonstrates how the choice of reference-day undermined the results of a portfolio 
that was constructed using metrics that calculated using one reference-day. These findings have 
implications for institutional strategies, such as market neutral funds, as well as academic studies 
that rely on a single reference-day to make inferences about relationships. Furthermore, it 
illustrates the need for a robust estimate of beta that is adjusted for the presence of reference-day 
risk. A full breakdown of beta ranges can be found in Appendix D. 
Subsequently, this paper continues by focusing on reference-day risk in correlations. Correlations 
over the five-year period had an average range from their highest to lowest day of 0.24, a median 
range of 0.22 and a standard deviation of 0.09. Glencore, MTN and Growthpoint had the largest 
ranges of 0.46, 0.44 and 0.42 respectively. Companies with the lowest ranges were Naspers, 
Standard Bank and Old Mutual of 0.09, 0.12 and 0.13 respectively. The tendency for Naspers to 
have significantly lower reference-day risk in its’ correlation than other companies is explained by 
the higher weight Naspers holds in the All Share Index (18%) as of September 2018. Of the fifty-
six companies three (3%) correlations; Glencore, Intu and Truworths, changed signs from negative 
to positive from -0.02 to 0.44, -0.13 to 0.18 and -0.02 to 0.35 respectively. Furthermore, assuming 
a meaningful positive relationship between two variables is evidenced with a correlation 
coefficient greater than 0.5 as per Chapter 3. Eighteen of the fifty-six companies (32%) had 
correlations moving from below to above 0.5 when the reference-day was varied. To understand 
the relationship of correlations across reference-days we undertake two statistical tests. First, we 
test the statistical significance of the correlation on the twenty reference-days for each of fifty-six 
companies, using a t-test with the hypotheses and test statistic: 
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𝐻0: that the true correlation in the population is 0 (ρ = 0) 
𝐻1: the correlation in the population is different from 0 (ρ ≠ 0) 
 
𝑡 =  
𝑟𝑥𝑦√𝑛 − 2
√1 − 𝑟2
 , 
where t is the t-test statistic, 𝑟𝑥𝑦 is the correlation between sample x and sample y, and n is the 
sample size. Secondly, we use a Fisher r-to-z transformation and a two-tailed z-test to investigate 
whether the highest correlation coefficient for the twenty reference-days is significantly different 
from the lowest correlation. 
Across the fifty-six companies, on average seventeen of the twenty reference-days had correlations 
that were significant at the 5% level, and eighteen at the 10% significance level. The median 
number of reference-days with significant correlations was nineteen at the 5% level and twenty at 
the 10% level. Out of the fifty-six companies twenty-six (47%) had all their correlations significant 
at both the 5% and 10% level across reference-days; while one company – Intu Properties, had no 
significant correlations at either the 5% or 10% level. The property and resource sectors had the 
fewest significant correlations at the 5% level, with an average of thirteen and fifteen significant 
correlations across reference-days respectively. Financials and telecommunications had the 
highest number of significant correlations, with averages of twenty and nineteen days respectively. 
There was no consistency of statistical significance across reference-days. Where, for example, 
Pick ‘n Pay had fifteen correlations significantly different from zero across reference-days; while 
Shoprite had twelve significant correlations across reference-days with the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 
8th and 20th days not significantly different from zero. Another example was Telkom, which across 
the twenty reference-days had correlations on the 17th and 19th day that were not significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. These results show that the significance of individual 
correlations varies across reference-days, where the significance is not consistent across 
companies or sectors.  
We used a Fisher r-to-z transformation and a two-tailed z-test to investigate if the highest 
correlation coefficient for the twenty reference-days were significantly different to the lowest 
correlation, using the hypotheses and formula: 
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𝐻0: Max 𝑟𝑥𝑦 = Min 𝑟𝑥𝑦 
𝐻1: Max 𝑟𝑥𝑦 ≠ Min 𝑟𝑥𝑦 
 
𝑍𝑥𝑦 =  
0.5 ln (
1 + 𝑟𝑥
1 − 𝑟𝑥
) − 0.5𝑙𝑛 (
1 + 𝑟𝑦
1 − 𝑟𝑦
)
√(
1
𝑁𝑥 − 3
) + (
1
𝑁𝑦 − 3
)
  , 
where 𝑍𝑥𝑦 is the z test statistic, 𝑟𝑥 is the sample x correlation, 𝑟𝑦 is the sample y correlation, 𝑁𝑥 is 
the size of sample x and 𝑁𝑦 is the size of sample y.  
Despite the high ranges observed in the returns data for correlations, no stock’s highest correlation 
was significantly different from the lowest correlation across reference-days at the 10% level. 
However, the companies with the lowest p-values were MTN, Glencore and Growthpoint, with p-
values of 0.1211, 0.1499 and 0.1738 respectively. These three companies happened to have the 
largest high-low ranges across reference-days for correlations.  
These findings have implications for understanding the interrelationship between assets and the 
statistical significance of such relationships. Since these relationships are a fundamental input into 
the construction of efficient portfolios, they are of particular importance to this paper. For example, 
an investor looking to add diversifying exposure to a long index portfolio and using the 20th 
reference-day of the month would find Glencore to exhibit a negative correlation of -0.02. The 
result of including Glencore in the portfolio would be counterintuitive, as across the other nineteen 
reference-days the correlation between the index and Glencore was positive and could be as high 
as 0.44 if the 14th reference-day was used. Thus, on average, the investor’s portfolio would move 
more in-line with the market movements than initially thought. The same logic applies to 
Truworths, where the correlation ranged from -0.02 to 0.35. Even if the correlations did not vary 
from positive to negative, they had implications for both risk management and portfolio 
construction. Suppose a portfolio manager has a mandate which allows for stocks with a certain 
correlation threshold to be added to the portfolio, for example, stocks with a correlation of 0.3 or 
less to the market. When the 6th reference-day was used, the Pioneer Food Group had a correlation 
of 0.42 against the market and would be excluded from this process. However, on the 1st reference-
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day, the company had a correlation of 0.25 and thus would be eligible for inclusion. These 
examples highlight the need for a correlation that is not impacted by the choice of reference-day 
to base sound investment, risk management and portfolio construction decisions on. A full 
breakdown of correlation ranges is found in Appendix E. 
 
4.1.3. Interrelationships of average returns, standard deviations, correlations and betas in 
the presence of reference-day risk  
This paper proceeds by addressing the interrelationships between the different metrics exposure to 
reference-day risk. Below are regressions comparing the maximum-minimum ranges for each 
metric relative to each other. They are compared in order to assess the dependency of reference-
day risk across metrics. 
Average returns and standard deviations exhibited the closest relationship in high-low ranges, with 
41% of the variation in standard deviation ranges being explained by the variation in average return 
ranges. Average returns and correlations exhibited the weakest relationship with an 𝑅2 of 0%. This 
implied that companies which displayed a high range in average returns across reference-days, 
would also exhibit a high range in standard deviations, but not with correlations. The relationship 
between average returns and betas were between the two, with an 𝑅2 of 28%.  
Overall these regressions (charted below) suggested that the exposure of a company’s statistical 
properties to reference-day risk is metric specific. Furthermore, this showed that having high 
reference-day risk in one metric did not result in having high reference-day risk in others. For 
example, while average returns and standard deviation ranges across references days had a 
relatively strong relationship, the relationship between standard deviation and correlation ranges 
only had an 𝑅2 of 2%. Furthermore, the relationship between beta and correlation ranges was 
strong relative to others, with an  𝑅2 of 25%. This result is explained because of the inclusion of 
correlations in the calculation of beta. In conclusion, there were varying degrees of explanatory 
power between the ranges of different metrics across reference-days. Overall there was not a strong 
explanatory relationship in the degree of reference-day risk for one metric relative to another. 
Therefore, a method for estimating reference-day risk-free versions of each metric needs to be 
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developed to ensure a robust toolbox of statistical measures for practical application. The method, 
as proposed in this paper, must be able to be consistently applied across metrics. 
 
Figure 1: The OLS regression of average return and standard deviation ranges across reference-
days. 
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Figure 2: The OLS regression of average return and beta ranges across reference-days.  
 
Figure 3: The OLS regression of average return and correlation ranges across reference-days.  
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Figure 4: The OLS regression of standard deviation and correlation ranges across reference-days. 
 
Figure 5: The OLS regression of beta and correlation ranges across reference-day. 
 
4.2. Investigation into using a bootstrapping method to estimate average returns, standard 
deviations, correlations and betas in the presence of reference-day risk 
While the primary goal of this paper is to apply reference-day risk-free metrics to the construction 
of efficient portfolios, this application begins with the accurate estimation of model inputs across 
reference-days. A technique to accomplish this, recommended by Baker et al. (2016), was to 
average the values across reference-days. In this section, we investigate the use of a bootstrapped 
distribution method to estimate average returns, standard deviations, correlations and betas that 
are independent of reference-day risk. First, we use simulated data to test the robustness and 
accuracy of the method. We then apply the process to the fifty-six-company sample in order to 
estimate average returns, standard deviations, correlations and betas independent of reference-day 
risk. As per Baker et al. (2016), we use the expected value of this distribution as estimate of the 
real underlying metric, and the dispersion of the distribution as a measure of the degree of 
y = 0,1258x + 0,1682
R² = 0,2449
0,00
0,05
0,10
0,15
0,20
0,25
0,30
0,35
0,40
0,45
0,50
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
C
O
R
R
E
L
A
T
IO
N
 M
A
X
-M
IN
 D
IF
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
BETA MAX-MIN DIFFERENCE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BETA AND CORRELATION RANGES
 41 
reference-day risk. The standard deviation of the bootstrapped distribution along with the high-
low range of estimates across reference-days, serve as two measures of reference-day risk for a 
given metric.  We assume each metric is pulled from an underlying unobservable distribution. This 
paper aims to estimate the reference-day risk-free metric as the expected value of this underlying 
distribution for a period of time, as per Chapter 3. 
 
4.2.1. Data simulation and evidence in simulated data 
Through using Geometric Brownian motion, we simulated stock returns data for sixty months 
(1200 trading days). The simulation was started from a predefined base price, and subsequent price 
movements were determined from the assumption that the price the following day is a function of 
the previous days using the formula: 
𝑆𝑡 =  𝑆𝑡−1𝑒
(𝜇−
𝜎
2)×𝑑𝑡+√𝑑𝑡×𝑊(𝑡) , 
where 𝑆𝑡 is today’s price, e is the exponential variable, 𝜇 is the assets annualised average return, 
𝜎 is the annualised volatility, dt is the change in time, and W(t) is the stochastic random 
component.  
To imbed the relationship between the prices of the stock and the market index, we adjust the 
simulation by imposing a Cholesky Decomposition to the random error terms. Furthermore, we 
predefine the volatility levels for both the stock and the index returns for simulation.  
We repeat this simulation process for average returns, standard deviations and correlations where 
lognormal returns for both the index and hypothetical stock were calculated. The same Cholesky 
Decomposition matrix is then used to modify the returns of the index into a sequence correlated 
with the hypothetical stock returns. We then convert these returns into a sixty by twenty matrix for 
easier computational analysis and in accordance with the format used for empirical data. 
A random reference-day, from one to twenty, is then chosen from each of the sixty months, for 
example, the 3rd of the first month, the 18th of the 2nd month, up to the 60th month. The average 
return, standard deviation, beta and correlation to the simulated index is calculated using these 
sixty returns. This process is repeated 100 000 times with replacement to generate a bootstrapped 
distribution of each metric (Baker et al., 2016).  The point estimate of this distribution is assumed 
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to be the true underlying value that is independent of reference-day risk for the period under 
analysis. This simulated data allowed us to test the underlying method by assuming values for 
average returns, standard deviations, correlations and betas over various intervals. Following this, 
the nonparametric bootstrapping method is applied to test if the point estimate of the bootstrapped 
distribution equates to the predefined value for each metric. However, we first tested if the 
simulated data exhibits reference-day risk across the four metrics.  
After simulating the data in accordance with the above method, we calculated the average return, 
standard deviation, correlation and beta across the twenty reference-days for the hypothetical 
company and index return series. Consistent with the empirical observations in section 4.1, we 
found varying degrees of reference-day risk across the four metrics using repeated samples of 
simulated data. 
Through simulation, we created daily price data whose returns were normally distributed. A 
breakdown of predefined values and the resulting distributions are found in Appendix F, G and H. 
For example, we varied betas from negative five to positive five, and correlations from negative 
one to positive one. We found that for all the metrics the distribution centred around the predefined 
value with varying degrees of dispersion depending on the sample. In the context of reference-day 
risk, the process resulted in the best estimate being found.  
The results indicated that as the predefined values tended towards zero for betas, correlations and 
standard deviations, the bootstrapped distributions became more normal and exhibited a higher 
standard deviation. When the values were closer to extremes on either side, for example, 5 and -5 
for betas, and -0.75 and 0.75 for correlations, the distributions were more peaked around the mean 
and displayed higher levels of skewness and kurtosis (Appendix F, G and H). Although the higher 
order moments varied as the predefined values changed, the mean – which is the focus of the 
method – remained almost exactly centred on the predefined value for all the metrics. However, 
average returns did not exhibit the same behaviour as the other three metrics, with fairly consistent 
measures of dispersion and normality as the predefined value was varied. These results were 
evidence of the robustness of the method for both the estimation of reference-day risk through the 
dispersion of the bootstrapped distribution, as well as in estimating reference-day risk-free metrics 
from the mean of the distribution. This method is applied to empirical price data from the JSE, in 
order to estimate reference-day risk-free metrics, measure the degree of reference-day risk, and 
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perform a comparative analysis, to better understand the nature and behaviour of reference-day 
risk in the South African context. 
 
4.3. Application of bootstrapped average returns, standard deviations, correlations and betas 
A bootstrapped distribution was generated for each of the fifty-six company’s underlying metrics 
– average returns, standard deviations, correlations and betas. For the four metrics, the 
bootstrapped distributions were approximately normally distributed, and the estimate was equal to 
the mean value across the twenty reference-days. To confirm these findings, we regressed the 
average value across reference-days against the bootstrapped values for the fifty-six companies. 
Across all of the metrics, there was an almost perfect linear relationship with an 𝑅2 of 99% for 
each instance. This relationship implied that the average value across reference-days was a good 
proxy for the reference-day risk-free estimates but lacked the statistical robustness and testing of 
the full bootstrapping method.  
From the data, it can be inferred that wider bootstrapped distributions - as measured by the standard 
deviation of the bootstrapped distribution - exhibited a higher degree of reference-day risk for a 
given metric. For example, Kumba Iron ore had the highest standard deviation of bootstrapped 
average returns of 1.42%, while Fortress A had the lowest at 0.36%. These results implied that 
Kumba had a higher degree of reference-day risk in average returns than Fortress A. The company 
which had the largest standard deviation of its bootstrap distribution, did not always have the 
highest range across the twenty reference-days. For instance, Capitec had a range of 7% in average 
returns across days, but a standard deviation of 0.51% in the bootstrapped distribution. In contrast, 
AngloGold Ashanti had a smaller range of 5.2% across days but had a dispersion over two times 
higher, of 1.14%. To further this point, we regressed the standard deviation of the bootstrapped 
distribution for each company against the corresponding high-low range for each metric across 
reference-days. This was to evaluate the extent to which the high-low range could be used as a 
proxy to measure reference-day risk. Average returns resulted in a 𝑅2of 34%, standard deviations 
an 𝑅2 of 79%, betas an 𝑅2 of 0% and correlations an 𝑅2 of 46%. Moreover, the results 
demonstrated that the relationship was not consistent across metrics and that each metric needed 
to be evaluated individually, when testing and adjusting for reference-day risk as per section 4.1. 
These results highlighted that although the range provided a good proxy of the degree of reference-
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day risk, a more robust estimate was the standard deviation of the bootstrapped distribution due to 
a larger sample size and more empirical support of the method. 
The expected value of the distribution was equal to or within half a standard deviation of the 
average across reference-days. These findings were consistent across all the metrics and is evident 
from the data provided in appendices B, C, D and E.  In addition, this paper provides the 
bootstrapped distributions of the highest and lowest ranges for each metric. It highlights the 
distribution mean and standard deviation as measures of the reference-day risk-free estimate and 
the degree of reference-day risk respectively. Figure 6 shows the bootstrapped average return 
distribution of Kumba Iron Ore and Richemont, who had the largest and smallest ranges in average 
returns respectively.  
 
Figure 6: The bootstrapped average return distributions for the companies with the highest and 
lowest ranges of unadjusted average returns. Where STD represents the standard deviation of the 
distribution. 
KUMBA RICHEMONT 
Mean: 1.79% 
STD: 1.42% 
Mean: 1.28% 
STD: 1.53% 
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Figure 7 shows the bootstrapped standard deviations of Kumba Iron Ore and AVI, who had the 
highest and lowest ranges in standard deviations respectively. 
Figure 7: The bootstrapped standard deviation distributions for the companies with the highest and 
lowest ranges of unadjusted standard deviations. Where STD represents the standard deviation of 
the distribution. 
Figure 8 shows the bootstrapped correlations of Glencore and Standard Bank, who had the highest 
and lowest ranges in correlations respectively.  
 
  
Figure 8: The bootstrapped correlation distributions for the companies with the highest and lowest 
ranges of unadjusted correlations. Where STD represents the standard deviation of the distribution. 
KUMBA AVI 
Mean: 21.99% 
STD: 3.08% 
Mean: 5.12% 
STD: 0.39% 
STANDARD BANK 
Mean: 0.54 
STD: 0.0678 
GLENCORE 
Mean: 0.24 
STD: 0.12 
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Figure 9 shows the bootstrapped betas of Glencore and Redefine, who had the highest and lowest 
ranges in betas respectively.  
 
Figure 9: The bootstrapped distributions for the companies with the highest and lowest ranges. 
Where STD represents the standard deviation of the distribution. 
To analyse the extent to which the reference-day risk-free bootstrapped betas were different from 
the unadjusted end of month betas from Bloomberg, we compared the differences across the fifty-
six companies. There were two companies, Woolworths and Netcare that had bootstrapped betas 
that were the same as their Bloomberg comparable.  Furthermore, sixteen companies (27%) had 
betas that were larger than the Bloomberg betas, and forty (71%) with betas smaller. Glencore and 
Intu had the largest differences with bootstrapped betas, of 0.91 and 0.04 compared to the 
Bloomberg betas of 1.83 and 0.77 respectively. The average difference between the bootstrapped 
and Bloomberg betas was 0.1, the median difference 0.12, and a standard deviation of 0.27. Lastly, 
we regressed the bootstrapped betas against the Bloomberg comparable. The relationship was 
weak considering the wide use of these Bloomberg betas in practice, with an 𝑅2 of 61% (Figure 
10). These results showed that there is room for improvement in the calculation of betas that are 
pulled from such platforms, to account for phenomena such as reference-day risk. The result of 
not making such adjustments could cause misestimation of systematic risk and inaccurate 
inferences to be drawn. 
Mean: 0.91 
STD: 0.4585 
GLENCORE REDEFINE 
Mean: 0.56 
STD: 0.14 
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Figure 10: A regression of Bloomberg OLS betas against bootstrapped betas. 
This process was repeated with correlations, which contrasted our bootstrapped values with those 
pulled from Bloomberg for the comparable period. None of the Bloomberg correlations were the 
same as the bootstrapped values. Forty-eight companies (86%) had Bloomberg correlations that 
were lower than the bootstrapped alternatives, and eight companies (14%) had a higher Bloomberg 
correlation. Intu had the largest difference between the bootstrapped correlation (0.02) and the 
Bloomberg value (0.33), of 0.31 for the companies where the Bloomberg correlation was greater 
than the bootstrapped comparable. Old Mutual had the largest difference out of the companies, 
where the bootstrapped correlation was higher than Bloomberg’s of 0.76. The average difference 
between the two estimates across the fifty-six companies was -0.1, the median -0.09 and the 
standard deviation 0.14. Lastly, we regressed the bootstrapped correlations against the Bloomberg 
comparable. At 40% the 𝑅2 was slightly lower than the equivalent beta regression. As discussed 
in section 4.1.2, this has important implications for the objective of this paper, and it continues to 
highlight the need to find a correlation that is adjusted for reference-day risk.  Furthermore, 
researchers should not primarily trust correlations that are published by data providers, as they 
could lead to diversification effects that are dependent more on the choice of reference-day than 
the underlying relationship. 
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Figure 11: A regression of Bloomberg correlations against bootstrapped correlations.  
These findings emphasised the importance of adjusting for reference-day risk when calculating 
inputs for the modelling of optimised portfolios. Without these adjustments, metrics are exposed 
to being biased to the choice of initial reference-day and could cause the incorrect relationship 
between risk and return to be assumed. Furthermore, it would have a notable effect on the 
measurement of inter-asset relationships based on correlations and betas. A summary table of the 
simulated point estimates for average returns, standard deviations, correlations and betas for the 
fifty-six companies as well as relevant statistics is found in Appendix B, C, D and E respectively. 
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Chapter 5: A case study on the reference-day risk-free portfolio 
 
This Chapter extends the findings of section 4.3 to broad asset classes.  Initially, it is shown that 
reference-day risk exists in broadly diversified indices, which represent these respective asset 
classes. Following this, we will demonstrate that the choice of reference-day can significantly 
influence the optimal maximum Sharpe portfolio. Lastly, the optimal maximum Sharpe portfolio 
is constructed, which is independent of reference-day risk. This is achieved by calculating the 
reference-day risk-free model inputs as per section 4.2.1. We then compare this portfolio to the 
unadjusted alternative using the end of month data that was sourced from Bloomberg, which 
represents the portfolio exposed to reference-day risk. Equities are represented by the JSE All 
Share Index; international equities by the MSCI World Index; Commodities by the Bloomberg All 
Commodity Index; Property by the JSE property index; and fixed income by the JSE All Bond 
Index, over the period of the 1st January 2013 to 31st December 2017 as per Chapter 3. This period 
is referred to as the in-sample period. Due to data availability, the out-of-sample period runs from 
the 1st January 2018 to the 31st December 2018. 
 
5.1. The application of reference-day risk-free metrics to constructing efficient portfolios 
As with simulated data and individual companies, there is evidence of reference-day risk across 
all broad asset classes for average returns, standard deviations and correlations. A summary of 
high-low ranges for average returns and standard deviations are provided in the table below. It is 
evident that the degree of reference-day risk differs across asset classes, with locally focused asset 
classes, such as local equities and property, having the highest sensitivity to the choice of 
reference-day. 
 
Asset Class 
Average Return High-Low 
Range 
Standard Deviation High-
Low Range 
Local Equities 1.33% 3.02%* 
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International Equities 0.54% 1.98%*** 
Fixed Income 0.82% 1.69%** 
Commodities 1.32% 1.38% 
Property 1.9% 4.64%* 
 
Table 1: The difference between the maximum and minimum average return and standard 
deviation across reference-days for the major asset classes. * is significant at the 5% level, ** at 
the 10% level and *** at the 20% level. 
These ranges were relatively lower than the single company ranges we found in section 4.1. This 
could be due to the diversifying effect of using an index as addressed by Fama and French (1993), 
who found a smaller degree of reference-day risk in portfolios relative to single stocks. 
Additionally, this links to the empirical literature on risk, which states that through combining 
uncorrelated assets the volatility of the portfolio can be reduced. These results indicated that this 
principle applies to the reduction of reference-day risk and total risk, as measured by standard 
deviation. However, constructing portfolios did not mitigate or remove the problems caused by 
reference-day risk. Therefore, a method to both measure and adjust for its effects is useful for 
investment practitioners looking to use the mean-variance framework in portfolio construction. 
As with individual companies, we tested for statistical significance in the difference between the 
highest and the lowest average return and standard deviation for each asset class. We did these 
tests across reference-days with the use of a two-sided t-test and an F-test respectively.  
The results indicated no asset class had their highest average return being significantly different 
from their lowest average return at the 20% level. Property had the lowest p-value of 0.49 whereas 
international equities had the highest at 0.76. This was based on the null hypothesis of equality of 
the highest and lowest average returns across reference-days. Moreover, property had the most 
significant difference in its standard deviations (p-value of 0.015) that were significant at the 5% 
level, followed by local equities (p-value of 0.04). Fixed income’s difference in standard 
deviations across reference-days was significant at the 10% level (p-value of 0.09); while the 
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international equities difference was significantly different at the 20% level (p-value of 0.125). 
Commodities standard deviations were not significantly different (p-value of 0.38).   
Correlations between the asset classes exhibited large degrees of reference-day risk; with a full 
breakdown of cross-correlations between asset classes provided in Appendix I and illustrated in 
Figure 12 and 13 below. These figures highlight the large ranges of correlations between different 
asset classes depending on the choice of reference-day. 
 
Figure 12: The correlations across twenty reference-days between equities (ALSI) and bonds 
(ALBI).  
 
Figure 13: The correlations across twenty reference-days between property (SAPY) and 
commodities (Bloomberg commodity index).  
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The charts show that correlations are dynamic and time-varying, depending on when the two related 
series are analysed. For example, the correlation between property and commodities in Figure 13 
was negative for the start of the month; became positive during the middle; and then became 
negative again towards the end. Anyone wanting to build a portfolio of negatively correlated 
assets, using any of the days from the 9th to the 18th day would have assumed a positive relationship 
between the two asset classes. While in fact, half of the reference-days resulted in a negative 
correlation. Even if the correlations did not vary from positive to negative, there were large 
variations in the degree of positive correlation. For example, international equities and 
commodities reached a correlation of 0.55 on the 15th and 16th reference-day and 0.19 on the 4th 
day. Therefore, it is important to use an estimate of correlation that is not dependent on the choice 
of reference-day to ensure that the most accurate inferences are drawn regarding the relationship 
between two investments and the diversification implications thereof. 
These findings provide evidence of the existence of reference-day risk across asset classes. We 
continue by addressing the implications that this variation in estimates has on the implementation 
of the mean-variance framework of Markowitz (1952). In accordance with the empirical literature, 
the optimal portfolio is defined as the portfolio which achieves the highest excess return above a 
risk-free alternative per unit of risk, referred to as the Sharpe ratio.  
We begin by calculating the optimal portfolio for each of the twenty reference-days using the 
average returns, standard deviations and correlations of each asset class for that specific reference-
day. Below, Figure 14 highlights the wide range of portfolios which could be considered optimal 
for the five-year period based on the initial choice of reference-day and the Markowitz (1952) 
mean-variance framework.   
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Figure 14: The maximum Sharpe portfolios using the mean, standard deviation and correlation of 
each reference-day. 
Not only did the average return across portfolios vary from 9.1% on the 14th reference-day to 
12.1% on the 1st reference-day, but the volatility of these returns ranged from 6.98% on the 7th 
reference-day to 8.7% on the 15th day. These results have implications for both optimising and 
selecting the most efficient portfolio based on historical data. For example, the portfolio from the 
20th reference-day achieved an average return of 12% with a volatility of 7.7%; while the 13th 
reference-day achieved an average return of 9.3% for the same level of volatility as the 20th day. 
A rational investor would prefer the portfolio from the 20th day as it yields a higher average return 
for the same level of risk. Although by using only one reference-day they would be unaware of 
more efficient alternatives, or know which portfolio was truly optimal. From an alternative 
perspective, the portfolio optimised on the 15th day yielded an average return of 10% with a 
volatility of 8.7%; while the 7th day yielded the same average return but with a 6.78% volatility. 
Therefore, a rational investor would prefer the portfolio calculated on the 7th day to the 15th day.  
However, if they used the end of month data, the investor would be unaware of the large 
divergences in model inputs and subsequent portfolios due to reference-day risk.  
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In conclusion, the portfolio optimised using the inputs from the 20th, and 7th reference-days are 
preferred as they yielded a higher or the same average return for the same or lower level of 
volatility. Both these portfolios were optimised over the same period. Thus, there is a need to 
identify the model inputs that are independent of reference-day risk. to ensure that the most 
efficient portfolio is constructed based on the inputs that represent the most accurate underlying 
risk-return dynamics for each asset. 
To emphasise the divergence across reference-days we track the performance of each reference-
day’s optimal portfolio over the in-sample and out-of-sample periods in Figure 15 and 16 below. 
Graphical inspection showed that the portfolios moved together over time in-sample, with an 
average correlation between portfolios of 0.97, a median of 0.97 and a standard deviation of 0.025. 
The performance ranged from a 53% gain to a 75% gain depending on the choice of initial 
reference-day and assuming monthly rebalancing. The average return for portfolios across 
reference-days for the full five-year period was 60%, the median 59% and the standard deviation 
was 5.37%. However, this has limited practical implications for investors as the optimised weights 
are only known ex-post. Subsequently, we assess the out-of-sample returns based on the in-sample 
optimisation. 
Figure 15: The performance of portfolio’s optimised on each of the twenty reference-days during 
the in-sample period.  
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Figure 16: The performance of the portfolio’s optimised on each of the twenty reference-days 
during the out-of-sample period.  
The graphical inspection of Figure 16 showed that the portfolios tended to move together over 
time with an average correlation of 0.96, a median correlation of 0.97 and a standard deviation of 
correlations of 0.04 across reference-days. The performances ranged from -11.6% on the 1st 
reference-day to -1% on the 14th day. The average return for portfolios across the out-of-sample 
period was -6.1%, with a standard deviation of 2.71% across days. The results showed that the 
best performing reference-day portfolio in-sample was the worst performing in the out-of-sample 
period. Therefore, investment practitioners who optimise their portfolio using a single reference-
day without adjusting model inputs to account for reference-day risk, are susceptible to large 
deviations in actual performance relative to expectations. We address these issues by estimating 
the optimal reference-day risk-free portfolio. This is the portfolio that represents the best estimate 
of return, risk and correlation after accounting for the influence of reference-day risk.  
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5.2. Estimating the reference-day risk-free optimal portfolio 
This paper has provided evidence of the existence of reference-day risk across key risk-return 
metrics for individual companies and asset classes. We continue by combining both sections in 
order to estimate the optimal portfolio independent of reference-day risk. To begin this process, 
we repeat the method that was used for individual companies in section 4.3 and estimate the 
reference-day risk-free estimates of average returns, standard deviations and correlations across 
the previously discussed asset classes. Provided below in Figure 17 are four charts showing the 
distributional properties of these metrics for selected asset classes. 
 
 
 
Figure 17: The selected distributions of bootstrapped average returns, correlations and standard 
deviations. 
ALSI ALBI CORRELATION ALBI STANDARD DEVIATION 
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We calculated the optimal portfolio using the end of month data sourced from Bloomberg and our 
estimates of bootstrapped reference-day risk-free average returns, standard deviations and 
correlations for each asset class. The results indicated that the Bloomberg data overstated average 
returns and understated standard deviations. The average returns from Bloomberg were higher for 
the five asset classes, and the standard deviations were lower for the ALSI, SAPY and MSIC 
World, relative to the reference-day risk-free values. Correlations from Bloomberg were lower 
than their reference-day risk-free counterparts, for example, the Bloomberg correlation between 
the ALSI and SAPY was 0.12; while the reference-day risk-free correlation was 0.43. This 
combination of higher average returns, lower standard deviations and lower correlations resulted 
in an optimised portfolio that had higher local equity exposure, higher property exposure and lower 
offshore and fixed income exposure than the reference-day risk-free portfolio. When Bloomberg 
data is used an investor would inadvertently be allocating a higher exposure of the portfolio to the 
two asset classes with the largest levels of volatility. The table below summarises the optimised 
weights from each portfolio and provides a chart depicting the related performance over the in-
sample period along with individual asset class performance. 
Asset Class Bloomberg Weight 
Reference-day Risk-
Free Weight 
Difference 
Local Equities 46% 32% 13% 
International Equities 7% 18% -23% 
Fixed Income 14% 37% 20% 
Commodities 0% 0% 0% 
Property 33% 13% 11% 
 
Table 2: The optimised weights based on Bloomberg and bootstrapped inputs.  
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Figure 18: The relative performance of asset classes, Bloomberg end of month optimised portfolio 
and reference-day risk-free optimised portfolio. RDRF Portfolio represents the reference-day risk-
free portfolio. 
Overall Figure 18 shows that the end of month optimal portfolio returned 79%; while the reference-
day risk-free portfolio returned 64% over the five-year period, with Sharpe ratios of 0.84 and 0.56 
respectively. The higher risk-adjusted performance for the end of month portfolio is explained by 
the higher average return, lower standard deviation and lower correlation inputs relative to the 
reference-day risk-free portfolio. To better understand the relationship between the two portfolios 
we used regression analysis to investigate the extent to which the returns of the Bloomberg 
portfolio explained the returns of the reference-day risk-free portfolio (Figure 19). They were 
highly correlated with an R squared of 93%, and the reference-day risk-free portfolio moved 0.83% 
for every 1% increase in the Bloomberg portfolio. 
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Figure 19: An OLS regression of reference-day risk-free portfolio returns against end of month 
Bloomberg portfolio returns. 
Following this process, to understand the primary drivers of the returns for both the Bloomberg 
portfolio and the reference-day risk-free portfolio we regressed each asset class against both 
portfolios. The results are summarised in Table 3 below. 
Asset Class 
Beta to Bloomberg 
Portfolio 
Beta to Adjusted 
Portfolio 
Local Equities 0.56 0.45 
International Equities 0.54 0.50 
Fixed Income 0.53 0.56 
Property 0.54 0.35 
 
Table 3: The betas of each portfolio against individual asset classes. 
Table 3 shows that the reference-day risk-free portfolio had a lower systematic risk, lower 
sensitivity to the most volatile property sector, less exposure to offshore market risk and a similar 
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beta in relation to fixed income. This highlighted that the risk level of the Bloomberg portfolio 
was overstated based on using the end of month data relative to the reference-day risk-free 
underlying metrics for the period. 
Similar to the portfolio’s that were optimised on each of the twenty reference-days in Figure 16, 
we test the out-of-sample performance of both the end of month Bloomberg portfolio and our 
reference-day risk-free portfolio below in Figure 20. The weights of each portfolio were based on 
the optimised weights from the in-sample period. The reference-day risk-free portfolio 
outperformed by 6.2% during 2018 with a -6% return; while the end of month Bloomberg portfolio 
was down -12.20%.  
 
Figure 20: The out-of-sample performance of the end of month optimal Bloomberg portfolio 
relative to the reference-day risk-free optimal portfolio. 
In conclusion, there were large difference in inputs, allocation weights and performance when the 
reference-day risk-free portfolio was compared to an unadjusted end of month alternative. While 
the unadjusted portfolio performed better over the in-sample period, the inputs that were used were 
not an accurate reflection of the risk-return dynamics of the underlying assets. The bootstrapping 
method outlined in section 4.2.1 provided the most accurate estimate of metrics in the presence of 
reference-day risk. By using these adjusted metrics as inputs for portfolio optimisation, the 
portfolio would more accurately represent the real underlying risk-return profile. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
The objectives of this paper were to establish the extent to which reference-day risk impacted 
commonly used risk-return metrics on the JSE as well as to establish a multi-metric method to 
both measure and adjust for the presence of reference-day risk. Lastly, it aimed to apply these 
findings to modern portfolio theory in order to construct the optimal reference-day risk-free 
portfolio. In accordance with the results of Baker et al. (2016) and Sahadev et al. (2018), we 
concluded that reference-day risk exists across average returns, standard deviations, correlations 
and betas at both a single stock and index level on the JSE as well as in simulated data. This has 
implications for valuation, portfolio theory, risk management, and it emphasises the need for a 
practical, robust and cross-metric method for estimating reference-day risk-free metrics. After 
proving the existence of reference-day risk across metrics, this paper used a nonparametric 
bootstrapping method to determine the values of average returns, standard deviations, correlations 
and betas adjusted for reference-day risk. First, we provided evidence of the method’s accuracy by 
predefining values for each metric and generating a bootstrapped distribution composed of 100 
000 iterations. The mean and standard deviation of the bootstrapped distribution was shown to be 
appropriate estimates of the predefined reference-day risk-free value and the associated level of 
reference-day risk respectively. We applied this method to the largest fifty-six companies on the 
JSE and found that the bootstrapped values were approximately equal to the average across 
reference-days with an R squared of 99% for all the metrics. These findings were extended from 
single companies to portfolios that showed the extent to which both general and optimised 
portfolios were highly dependent on the choice of initial reference-day. Lastly, we used these 
reference-day risk-free values to find the optimal reference-day risk-free portfolio and performed 
a comparative analysis to a traditional end of month portfolio using Bloomberg data. We found 
that the end of month portfolio underperformed out-of-sample, overstated average returns, 
understated standard deviations and had lower correlations than those adjusted for reference-day 
risk. Therefore, it is important that reference-day risk is measured and accounted for in the process 
of applying the Markovitz (1952) mean-variance optimisation, in addition to any analysis that is 
based on statistical inputs measured on a single reference-day. 
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For further research, the findings of this paper can be applied to the practice of valuation and asset 
pricing, or they could be tested against additional metrics such as duration and convexity for fixed 
income instruments. Additionally, the extent to which the findings apply to global markets can be 
investigated in order to examine the geographic dependency of the results. This will allow 
investors to understand the global impact of reference-day risk better. Lastly, the findings can be 
extended to other portfolio optimisation methods, such as multi-factor models.  
This paper focused solely on the JSE and a resulting limitation is that the findings may have limited 
application to international markets. Furthermore, although this research included a large range of 
companies from different sectors, there were no smaller, less liquid companies presented. This 
means that these findings may not be generalisable to proportions of the population outside of the 
sample presented, as these samples may respond differently to conditions of reference-day risk.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A: List of the fifty-six qualifying companies used for this paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Companies  
Anglo American Platinum  Mr Price 
Anglo American PLC  MTN 
AngloGold Ashanti  Naspers 
Aspen Pharma  Nedbank 
AVI  Netcare 
Barclays  Old Mutual 
Barloworld  Pick n Pay 
BHP Billiton  Pioneer Food Group 
Bidvest  PSG Group 
British American Tabaco  Rand Merchant Holdings 
Capitec  Rand Merchant Investments 
Clicks  Redefine 
Coronations  Remgro 
Discovery  Resilient 
Exarro Resources  Richemont 
FirstRand  Sanlam 
Fortress A  Sappi 
Glencore  Sasol 
Goldfields  Shoprite 
Growth Point  SPAR 
Hyprop  Standard Bank 
Imperial  Telkom 
Intu  The Foshini Group 
Investec  Tiger Brands 
Kumba Iron Ore  Truworths 
Life Healthcare  Vodacom 
MMI  Vukile 
Mondi  Woolworths 
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Appendix B: Average return high, low, ranges and reference-day risk-free estimates 
 
Company Min Max Range Bootstrapped 20 Day Average STD of Bootstrapped
All Share Index 8.9% 10.2% 1.3% 9.4% 9.3% 0.3%
Anglo American Platinum 4.6% 9.9% 5.3% 7.2% 7.3% 0.9%
Anglo American PLC 12.7% 17.7% 4.9% 14.7% 14.8% 1.0%
Anglogold Ashanti -2.4% 2.8% 5.2% 0.4% 0.4% 1.1%
Aspen Pharma 14.6% 19.3% 4.7% 16.9% 17.0% 0.6%
AVI 18.3% 21.1% 2.8% 19.6% 19.6% 0.4%
Barclays 8.0% 13.7% 5.7% 10.8% 11.0% 0.5%
Barloworld 20.0% 25.1% 5.1% 22.6% 22.5% 0.6%
BHP Billiton 3.8% 6.6% 2.8% 5.3% 5.3% 0.7%
Bidvest 10.7% 15.2% 4.5% 11.9% 12.0% 0.6%
British American Tabaco 19.5% 21.4% 1.9% 20.6% 20.6% 0.4%
Capitec 45.5% 52.6% 7.0% 48.5% 48.3% 0.5%
Clicks 27.2% 30.9% 3.7% 28.3% 28.3% 0.4%
Coronations 21.8% 26.4% 4.6% 23.9% 24.0% 0.5%
Discovery 27.5% 31.1% 3.6% 29.2% 29.3% 0.5%
Exarro 10.6% 13.2% 2.6% 12.1% 12.2% 0.9%
FirstRand 20.3% 25.3% 5.0% 23.0% 23.0% 0.5%
Fortress A 13.1% 14.7% 1.6% 13.9% 14.0% 0.4%
Glencore 10.4% 17.8% 7.4% 13.4% 13.2% 0.9%
Goldfields -1.6% 3.2% 4.7% 0.8% 0.7% 1.1%
Growth Point 8.3% 11.3% 3.0% 9.6% 9.7% 0.4%
Hyprop 16.1% 18.3% 2.2% 16.9% 17.1% 0.4%
Imperial 12.5% 17.3% 4.8% 14.3% 14.4% 0.6%
Intu -5.6% 0.4% 6.0% -1.5% -1.4% 0.5%
Investec 15.3% 18.9% 3.6% 16.5% 16.5% 0.5%
Kumba Iron Ore 16.3% 28.8% 12.5% 23.7% 23.8% 1.4%
Life Healthcare 1.4% 3.9% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 0.5%
MMI 6.5% 9.9% 3.4% 8.5% 8.5% 0.5%
Mondi 34.0% 36.0% 1.9% 35.3% 35.3% 0.5%
Mr Price 18.8% 24.2% 5.4% 20.8% 21.0% 0.7%
MTN 3.1% 4.7% 1.6% 3.8% 3.9% 0.6%
Naspers 49.4% 52.5% 3.1% 50.9% 51.1% 0.6%
Nedbank 11.6% 14.5% 2.9% 13.0% 13.0% 0.4%
Netcare 8.9% 11.0% 2.1% 10.0% 10.1% 0.5%
Old Mutual 14.5% 16.3% 1.7% 15.4% 15.3% 0.4%
Pick n Pay 13.5% 16.7% 3.2% 15.1% 15.1% 0.5%
Pioneer Food Group 17.9% 22.3% 4.4% 20.8% 20.7% 0.5%
PSG Group 38.3% 44.2% 5.9% 41.3% 41.3% 0.6%
Rand Merchant Holdings 17.0% 22.2% 5.2% 19.4% 19.6% 0.5%
Rand Merchant Investments 17.6% 23.9% 6.3% 21.1% 21.0% 0.4%
Redefine 10.5% 12.8% 2.3% 11.7% 11.7% 0.4%
Remgro 10.2% 12.7% 2.6% 11.5% 11.5% 0.4%
Resilient 29.4% 33.0% 3.6% 31.5% 31.6% 0.4%
Richemont 16.0% 17.5% 1.5% 16.5% 16.6% 0.5%
Sanlam 19.6% 23.7% 4.1% 21.3% 21.3% 0.5%
Sappi 28.9% 32.2% 3.3% 30.5% 30.3% 0.6%
Sasol 9.7% 12.8% 3.1% 11.0% 10.9% 0.6%
Shoprite 5.7% 10.8% 5.1% 7.8% 8.0% 0.6%
SPAR 14.5% 17.2% 2.7% 15.9% 16.0% 0.5%
Standard Bank 17.0% 19.3% 2.4% 18.3% 18.2% 0.5%
Telkom 34.7% 37.9% 3.1% 36.2% 36.1% 0.7%
The Foshini Group 11.8% 18.2% 6.4% 14.3% 14.4% 0.7%
Tiger Brands 11.2% 13.5% 2.3% 12.3% 12.3% 0.5%
Truworths 4.7% 6.9% 2.3% 5.7% 5.7% 0.6%
Vodacom 10.7% 13.0% 2.3% 11.7% 11.9% 0.5%
Vukile 11.5% 14.7% 3.2% 13.2% 13.2% 0.4%
Woolworths 1.8% 5.8% 4.0% 3.7% 3.7% 0.6%
Average Returns
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Appendix C: Standard deviation high, low, ranges and reference-day risk-free estimates 
 
Company Min Max Range Bootstrapped 20 Day Average STD of Bootstrapped
All Share Index 10.7% 14.1% 3.3% 12.3% 12.4% 0.2%
Anglo American Platinum 45.4% 55.2% 9.8% 50.1% 49.9% 1.2%
Anglo American PLC 44.5% 56.8% 12.2% 49.5% 50.0% 1.9%
Anglogold Ashanti 50.5% 60.7% 10.3% 55.7% 55.8% 1.0%
Aspen Pharma 24.8% 32.7% 7.8% 28.0% 28.1% 0.5%
AVI 16.1% 18.9% 2.9% 17.7% 17.8% 0.4%
Barclays 20.0% 24.9% 5.0% 22.2% 22.4% 0.5%
Barloworld 25.4% 32.2% 6.9% 28.6% 28.7% 0.7%
BHP Billiton 26.6% 30.4% 3.8% 28.6% 28.7% 0.5%
Bidvest 33.4% 37.3% 3.9% 35.6% 35.8% 1.2%
British American Tabaco 14.5% 19.2% 4.7% 16.6% 16.6% 0.3%
Capitec 25.8% 30.0% 4.2% 27.8% 27.8% 0.5%
Clicks 19.0% 24.4% 5.3% 21.5% 21.6% 0.4%
Coronations 24.2% 30.2% 6.0% 27.1% 27.1% 0.5%
Discovery 20.4% 25.7% 5.3% 23.5% 23.5% 0.4%
Exarro 41.1% 47.2% 6.0% 44.4% 44.8% 1.2%
FirstRand 21.3% 25.5% 4.1% 23.4% 23.5% 0.5%
Fortress A 11.1% 17.1% 5.9% 13.3% 13.3% 0.4%
Glencore 43.0% 54.6% 11.6% 47.6% 47.7% 1.2%
Goldfields 46.6% 55.4% 8.8% 50.9% 51.1% 0.9%
Growth Point 16.6% 21.0% 4.4% 18.3% 18.4% 0.4%
Hyprop 18.5% 23.4% 4.8% 20.8% 20.8% 0.4%
Imperial 26.3% 34.4% 8.1% 30.4% 30.5% 0.6%
Intu 17.4% 25.0% 7.6% 21.4% 21.4% 0.5%
Investec 18.8% 23.4% 4.6% 21.0% 21.0% 0.4%
Kumba Iron Ore 65.2% 87.0% 21.8% 76.2% 76.9% 3.1%
Life Healthcare 20.8% 24.7% 3.9% 22.2% 22.3% 0.5%
MMI 21.5% 27.6% 6.1% 24.1% 24.2% 0.5%
Mondi 22.7% 26.2% 3.5% 24.5% 24.5% 0.4%
Mr Price 31.1% 35.2% 4.1% 33.0% 33.2% 0.6%
MTN 22.6% 30.0% 7.4% 25.4% 25.5% 0.6%
Naspers 26.6% 32.1% 5.5% 29.2% 29.3% 0.5%
Nedbank 18.5% 23.8% 5.4% 21.0% 21.0% 0.4%
Netcare 20.5% 25.9% 5.4% 23.2% 23.3% 0.4%
Old Mutual 17.7% 23.0% 5.3% 20.2% 20.2% 0.4%
Pick n Pay 23.3% 28.3% 5.1% 25.5% 25.6% 0.5%
Pioneer Food Group 23.1% 30.1% 7.0% 26.5% 26.5% 0.5%
PSG Group 26.8% 31.6% 4.7% 29.2% 29.3% 0.5%
Rand Merchant Holdings 19.9% 23.8% 3.9% 21.7% 21.8% 0.4%
Rand Merchant Investments 17.9% 22.8% 4.9% 20.4% 20.4% 0.4%
Redefine 17.6% 22.4% 4.8% 19.3% 19.4% 0.4%
Remgro 17.0% 23.1% 6.1% 19.7% 19.8% 0.4%
Resilient 19.7% 24.1% 4.5% 21.4% 21.5% 0.4%
Richemont 21.0% 24.4% 3.4% 22.7% 22.8% 0.6%
Sanlam 20.9% 27.2% 6.3% 24.1% 24.2% 0.5%
Sappi 25.2% 32.2% 7.0% 28.5% 28.6% 0.6%
Sasol 23.5% 31.0% 7.5% 26.6% 26.7% 0.6%
Shoprite 24.1% 28.7% 4.6% 26.8% 26.9% 0.6%
SPAR 20.2% 23.5% 3.3% 22.2% 22.3% 0.5%
Standard Bank 20.8% 25.4% 4.6% 23.0% 23.1% 0.5%
Telkom 31.0% 40.3% 9.4% 35.8% 35.8% 0.6%
The Foshini Group 28.0% 34.6% 6.7% 30.6% 30.7% 0.7%
Tiger Brands 19.6% 24.3% 4.7% 21.7% 21.7% 0.4%
Truworths 26.1% 32.9% 6.7% 29.2% 29.3% 0.5%
Vodacom 17.9% 22.4% 4.5% 19.8% 19.9% 0.4%
Vukile 13.1% 19.4% 6.2% 15.6% 15.6% 0.4%
Woolworths 21.0% 29.0% 8.0% 25.8% 25.8% 0.5%
Standard Deviations
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Appendix D: Beta high, low, ranges and reference-day risk-free estimates 
 
Company Min Max Range 20 Day Average Bloomberg Bootstrappped
Anglo American Platinum 1.11 2.29 1.17 1.74 1.40 1.74
Anglo American PLC 1.65 2.59 0.95 1.98 1.63 1.98
Anglogold Ashanti 0.76 2.19 1.44 1.28 1.19 1.29
Aspen Pharma 0.44 1.32 0.88 0.82 0.62 0.83
AVI 0.30 0.60 0.30 0.46 0.21 0.46
Barclays 0.56 0.95 0.39 0.74 0.69 0.73
Barloworld 0.26 0.93 0.67 0.67 0.32 0.68
BHP Billiton 1.40 1.71 0.31 1.57 1.82 1.57
Bidvest 0.18 1.27 1.08 0.60 0.31 0.62
British American Tabaco 0.35 0.72 0.38 0.53 0.79 0.52
Capitec 0.49 1.08 0.58 0.72 0.45 0.73
Clicks 0.43 0.89 0.46 0.65 0.55 0.65
Coronations 0.55 1.11 0.57 0.83 0.74 0.83
Discovery 0.65 0.98 0.34 0.82 0.59 0.81
Exarro 0.85 1.68 0.83 1.25 1.27 1.25
FirstRand 0.61 0.95 0.34 0.82 0.71 0.82
Fortress A 0.05 0.53 0.49 0.26 0.09 0.27
Glencore -0.09 1.74 1.82 0.87 1.83 0.91
Goldfields 0.07 0.95 0.89 0.42 0.34 0.43
Growth Point 0.11 0.67 0.56 0.48 -0.02 0.49
Hyprop 0.39 0.89 0.50 0.64 0.08 0.65
Imperial 0.77 1.49 0.72 1.06 0.88 1.08
Intu -0.22 0.27 0.48 0.04 0.77 0.04
Investec 0.98 1.23 0.25 1.11 1.14 1.11
Kumba Iron Ore 1.12 2.80 1.68 1.79 1.07 1.83
Life Healthcare 0.41 0.84 0.43 0.63 0.56 0.62
MMI 0.82 1.34 0.52 1.11 0.89 1.13
Mondi 0.72 1.15 0.43 0.93 1.08 0.92
Mr Price 0.55 1.27 0.72 0.86 0.63 0.85
MTN 0.35 1.19 0.84 0.90 0.63 0.92
Naspers 1.18 1.78 0.60 1.46 1.51 1.47
Nedbank 0.53 0.91 0.38 0.72 0.61 0.72
Netcare 0.45 1.07 0.62 0.82 0.83 0.82
Old Mutual 0.98 1.35 0.38 1.19 1.17 1.19
Pick n Pay 0.31 1.02 0.71 0.65 0.80 0.65
Pioneer Food Group 0.55 0.91 0.36 0.70 0.62 0.70
PSG Group 0.70 1.22 0.52 0.92 0.72 0.91
Rand Merchant Holdings 0.75 1.03 0.28 0.90 0.77 0.90
Rand Merchant Investments 0.73 1.03 0.30 0.88 0.62 0.88
Redefine 0.32 0.50 0.18 0.56 0.16 0.57
Remgro 0.76 1.20 0.44 0.96 0.81 0.95
Resilient 0.20 0.68 0.49 0.50 0.17 0.52
Richemont 0.79 1.13 0.34 1.02 1.29 1.02
Sanlam 0.96 1.37 0.41 1.21 1.03 1.22
Sappi 0.18 0.84 0.66 0.57 0.63 0.57
Sasol 1.12 1.70 0.58 1.38 1.40 1.38
Shoprite 0.35 0.84 0.49 0.56 0.22 0.57
SPAR 0.40 0.89 0.49 0.65 0.51 0.66
Standard Bank 0.83 1.12 0.29 1.01 0.89 1.00
Telkom 0.66 1.15 0.49 0.92 0.99 0.92
The Foshini Group 0.63 1.07 0.43 0.88 0.59 0.88
Tiger Brands 0.41 0.94 0.53 0.70 0.54 0.71
Truworths -0.06 0.79 0.85 0.44 0.59 0.42
Vodacom 0.39 0.90 0.51 0.61 0.74 0.60
Vukile 0.17 0.51 0.34 0.34 0.10 0.34
Woolworths 0.57 1.05 0.48 0.84 0.84 0.84
Betas
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Appendix E: Correlation high, low, ranges and reference-day risk-free estimates 
 
Company Min Max Range 20 Day Average Bloomberg Bootstrapped STD of Bootstrapped
Anglo American Platinum 0.33 0.50 0.17 0.43 0.32 0.42 0.08
Anglo American PLC 0.37 0.59 0.23 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.06
Anglogold Ashanti 0.15 0.50 0.34 0.28 0.18 0.28 0.10
Aspen Pharma 0.19 0.53 0.34 0.36 0.29 0.37 0.09
AVI 0.21 0.43 0.22 0.32 0.16 0.32 0.09
Barclays 0.33 0.49 0.17 0.41 0.36 0.41 0.08
Barloworld 0.11 0.40 0.30 0.29 0.12 0.29 0.09
BHP Billiton 0.61 0.74 0.13 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.05
Bidvest 0.06 0.46 0.40 0.21 0.10 0.22 0.11
British American Tabaco 0.30 0.48 0.19 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.07
Capitec 0.24 0.46 0.22 0.32 0.08 0.32 0.09
Clicks 0.26 0.50 0.23 0.37 0.30 0.37 0.08
Coronations 0.25 0.53 0.28 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.08
Discovery 0.34 0.51 0.17 0.43 0.33 0.43 0.07
Exarro 0.25 0.44 0.19 0.35 0.31 0.34 0.09
FirstRand 0.30 0.51 0.21 0.43 0.36 0.43 0.08
Fortress A 0.04 0.40 0.36 0.24 0.04 0.25 0.11
Glencore -0.02 0.44 0.46 0.23 - 0.24 0.12
Goldfields 0.01 0.23 0.22 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.10
Growth Point 0.07 0.49 0.42 0.32 0.04 0.33 0.10
Hyprop 0.22 0.50 0.28 0.38 0.03 0.38 0.08
Imperial 0.34 0.56 0.22 0.43 0.32 0.43 0.07
Intu -0.13 0.18 0.30 0.02 0.33 0.02 0.09
Investec 0.59 0.71 0.13 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.06
Kumba Iron Ore 0.17 0.40 0.23 0.29 0.17 0.29 0.08
Life Healthcare 0.25 0.45 0.20 0.35 0.21 0.35 0.08
MMI 0.39 0.68 0.28 0.57 0.47 0.57 0.06
Mondi 0.40 0.53 0.13 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.07
Mr Price 0.20 0.45 0.26 0.32 0.24 0.32 0.09
MTN 0.16 0.60 0.44 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.09
Naspers 0.49 0.73 0.23 0.62 0.57 0.62 0.06
Nedbank 0.34 0.53 0.19 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.08
Netcare 0.23 0.56 0.33 0.43 0.35 0.43 0.08
Old Mutual 0.66 0.79 0.13 0.73 -0.04 0.73 0.05
Pick n Pay 0.15 0.48 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.08
Pioneer Food Group 0.25 0.42 0.17 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.08
PSG Group 0.29 0.47 0.18 0.38 0.24 0.38 0.08
Rand Merchant Holdings 0.40 0.58 0.18 0.51 0.44 0.51 0.07
Rand Merchant Investments 0.45 0.59 0.14 0.53 0.36 0.53 0.07
Redefine 0.20 0.50 0.30 0.36 0.11 0.36 0.08
Remgro 0.51 0.68 0.17 0.59 0.50 0.59 0.06
Resilient 0.11 0.37 0.26 0.29 -0.02 0.30 0.09
Richemont 0.47 0.64 0.17 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.07
Sanlam 0.49 0.73 0.23 0.62 0.48 0.62 0.06
Sappi 0.08 0.37 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.10
Sasol 0.55 0.71 0.16 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.05
Shoprite 0.14 0.39 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.26 0.08
SPAR 0.21 0.49 0.29 0.36 0.30 0.36 0.08
Standard Bank 0.47 0.58 0.12 0.54 0.43 0.54 0.07
Telkom 0.23 0.39 0.15 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.08
The Foshini Group 0.26 0.45 0.20 0.35 0.22 0.35 0.08
Tiger Brands 0.21 0.54 0.33 0.40 0.31 0.41 0.08
Truworths -0.02 0.35 0.37 0.19 0.25 0.18 0.08
Vodacom 0.28 0.50 0.22 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.08
Vukile 0.12 0.41 0.28 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.10
Woolworths 0.26 0.48 0.22 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.08
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Appendix F: Simulated correlation distributions 
Mean: -0.75 
STD: 0.0578 
CORRELATION: -0.75 
Mean: 0.75 
STD: 0.0055 
CORRELATION: 0.75 
CORRELATION: -0.5 
Mean: -0.5 
STD: 0.1043 
CORRELATION: 0.5 
Mean: 0.5 
STD: 0.0977 
CORRELATION: -0.25 
Mean: -0.25 
STD: 0.1235 
Mean: 0.25 
STD: 0.1179 
CORRELATION: 0.25 
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Appendix G: Simulated beta distributions  
  
 
 
 
 
BETA: 5 BETA: -5 
BETA: 2.5 BETA: -2.5 
Mean: 5.02 
STD: 0.498 
Mean: -5.02 
STD: 0.480 
Mean: 2.5 
STD: 0.71 
Mean: -2.5 
STD: 0.71 
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Appendix H: Simulated standard deviation (annual) and mean distributions (daily) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STANDARD DEVIATION: 40% 
Mean: 40% 
STD: 3.3% 
Mean: 20% 
STD: 1.84% 
STANDARD DEVIATION: 20% 
AVERAGE RETURN: 0.03% 
Mean: 0.03% 
STD: 0.32% 
Mean: 0.2% 
STD: 0.33% 
AVERAGE RETURN: 0.2% 
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Appendix I: Asset class correlations across reference-days  
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